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“L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne 
se fera pas. “ 
Jacques Rueff1 
 
 
 
Reviewing European Monetary Unification – 
The path towards EMU and EMU’s first years of existence 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Undoubtedly, the start of EMU marked a new era in economic and monetary history 
in Europe, dramatically changed the environment of monetary and economic policy in 
general, always giving rise to vivid debates in economic theory and European policy 
making. EMU clearly accounted for one of the most profound European integration 
steps – if not the most profound – in post-World War II history. Unsurprisingly 
therefore Duwendag et al. insisted that EMU “has no historical predecessor” and that 
it is unique in its nature as “…sovereign states have replaced national currencies with 
the euro and conceded monetary policy authority to a new, common institution.” 2  
 
This supranational monetary policy by a single monetary authority (i.e. the ECB) – 
embedded in an unprecedented judicial and institutional framework (i.e. the Treaty of 
the European Union) – marked an unparalleled step in European monetary 
integration.  
Overall, economic reasoning behind creating EMU was to lay foundations ensuring 
increased prosperity and welfare, to increase market efficiency and competition in 
Europe, while keeping monetary stability. Especially the latter had for many decades 
been a concern in Europe, bearing in mind 20th century European history and 
especially the highly unstable inflationary periods of the interwar years.  
 
General consensus3 nonetheless agrees that, despite economics being a prime 
motive for the formation of EMU, it also constituted a significant step towards further 
political integration and towards completion of a unified Europe that guaranteed 
lasting peace and freedom. Analysing EMU from a historical and theoretical point of 
view is surely an ambitious task. Just as much as EMU surpasses the spectrum of 
economic union and covers, in its idea and conception, political aspects, the topic still 
remains highly discussed. One aim of this thesis therefore is to take this variety of 
approaches into account and merge them into an analysis of the run-up to EMU and 
of its first years of existence in order to answer the question whether EMU has 
brought advantages or has been a success story. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Rueff (1965), French economist, advisor to the government and member of the Académie Française on the 
occasion of his introductory speech at the Académie.  
2 See Duwendag et al. (1999), ch. 1 for a good introduction to EMU’s unique ‘nature’ 
3 See for instance Klaus (1996), Verdun (2002), Duroselle (2002) or Peterson and Shakleton (2002) 
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Economic Theory… 
 
Economic theory on monetary unions is mainly attributed to the Optimal Currency 
Area (OCA) theory developed first by Robert Mundell4 and extended by various other 
authors5. The question as to whether EMU is an OCA has always been subject to 
intense debates. Especially early contributions stated that EMU would not constitute 
such an optimal area in the initial stage and the doubtful question is whether it might 
ever turn into one over the years and decades to come6. 
 
…but also political and historical factors behind opting for EMU 
 
What were the ideas – other than economic reasoning – behind creating a single 
currency block within Europe? According to Verdun7, “…the EMU process is in part a 
result of the changes in the global economy and the pace and nature of the wider 
European Integration process…” and the “…global context is crucial in explaining 
European Integration more generally and EMU specifically.” Some go even further, 
claiming that it was Europe’s economic and political answer to globalisation.8  
 
Further aspects, as identified by Verdun and various others9, include the view that 
EMU would be the logical follow-up to the completion of the European Single Market 
by 1992, as previewed by the Single European Act, which went into force in July 
1987. Within the European context, growing trade and increasing economic 
interdependence led policy-makers to recognise the need for further economic 
coordination and cooperation. Opting for a common currency as an ultimate 
integration step therefore only seemed rational: a single European currency was 
considered to be a means to reap the remaining benefits from a Single European 
Market, to increase trade and to reduce transaction costs, eventually permitting a 
more efficient allocation of resources. With the creation of a Single Market, capital 
markets liberalised and a fixed exchange rate regime in place, autonomous monetary 
policy room for manoeuvre would have been limited or even non-existing – installing 
EMU therefore turned out to be the logical consequence.  
 
Over much of the 20th century fixed exchange rates have appealed to European 
policy makers who wanted to use the success of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) in the European Monetary System (EMS) to protect European economies 
from potentially disturbing speculative attacks by financial markets. Opting for fixed 
exchange rates fit well into the neo-liberal and monetarist consensus on monetary 
policy. It was maintained that manipulating exchange rates would only lead to short-
run benefits, ultimately resulting in wage and price inflation in the long-run. As a 
result, monetarists advocated stable or even fixed exchange rates, as well as 
structural reforms whose aim were the elimination of labour and product market 
rigidities, “instead of using exchange rate policy in the form of currency devaluation 
as the long-term cure of low productivity”10.  
                                                          
4 Mundell (1961)  
5 Among others McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), Ingram (1969), Fleming (1971), Ishiyama (1975) 
6 For example Kenen (1969) and (1995), Bofinger (1994a) or Ricci (1997) 
7 Verdun (2002), p. 3 
8 Lachs and Grünwald (1998) or Verdun (2002) 
9 For instance Pelkmans (1997), Eichengreen (1993), Eichengreen (1998) 
10 Hix (1999), p. 295 ff. 
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From a ‘non-German point of view’, EMU was thought by some member states to be 
a way to break the quasi-hegemonic monetary policy role of Germany, whose 
Bundesbank was setting interest rates that had to be followed by other member 
states in EMS. As we will see, the ECB statutes and policy undertakings very much 
resemble the pre-EMU Bundesbank style of monetary policy.  
 
A final point to be borne in mind concerns the historical context and the changing 
face of world politics with the demise of the Soviet Republic and the re-unification of 
Germany. In view of the latter, EMU also became a way to commit Germany closer to 
Europe and vice versa: In return for giving up the deutschmark and its independent 
monetary policy, Germany only agreed to the implementation of EMU on certain 
conditions to be met by all potential member states, i.e. the respect of economic 
convergence criteria and the setting-up of an independent – Bundesbank-style 
European Central Bank (ECB).  
 
 
This thesis will attempt to review European monetary unification while reuniting all 
these approaches helping to explain the creation of EMU. Considering the variety of 
factors coming into play, i.e. economic and theoretical reasoning, European and 
world politics and the overall historical context during the process of European 
integration, this thesis will try to show why EMU was the logical last step in European 
monetary integration and will furthermore try to look at economic facts and findings in 
order to assess EMU’s first years of existence.  
 
Offering a definite answer whether EMU has so far been a success story in European 
economic policy making, just as the Currency Union and the Single Market 
Programme were, may be a bit too early, but a first indication nonetheless seems 
possible and desirable. So far it seems that EMU member states have undertaken 
serious efforts to make EMU work. However one must admit that commitment has 
been different from country to country and some countries fare better than others. 
Overall though it is undisputed that the euro has become a global currency and that it 
has helped to solidify EMU’s and the EU’s role as a global economic player.  
 
Certainly, the empirical part of this thesis – considering that EMU is less than a 
decade old – cannot yet be exhaustive, nor will it claim to be able to offer a definite 
conclusion. Hopefully though it will give us an idea about where EMU stands right 
now and where EMU is heading to, identifying potential future problems and areas 
where reforms and changes have to take place in order to ensure the smooth 
functioning of EMU in the future.  
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2. A short historical overview: post-World War II Europe   
 
The European Union (EU) as we know it today only came into existence on 1 
November 1993 after the signing of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 
Maastricht on 7 February 1992. The EU reunited the European Coal and Steel 
Community of 1952, the European Economic Community established in 1957 and 
Euratom under one umbrella.  
 
The integration process – culminating in the creation of EU and EMU – in the 
decades following the Second World War was, as we will see, motivated by political, 
economic, historical and security factors and it was, over the years, advocated by a 
large number of European and international policy leaders.  
 
Historically one can say that European integration started with economic 
reconstruction, which was on one hand considered to be the only possibility to allow 
Europe to grow and evolve under stable domestic circumstances. Sound economies 
were considered to be essential to avoid the poverty trap and nationalistic tendencies 
to arise again, as it had happened in the interwar years in Germany and Austria. This 
reconstruction process was mostly ensured through external assistance provided by 
the winning parties of the World War. This assistance however was conditioned on 
certain factors to be fulfilled, among others the pledge of European nations to open 
up to international trade and to avoid the implementation of protectionist measures in 
the economic policy decision making process.  
 
The particularly problematic German-French relation after the war was thought to be 
solved by the particular character of institutional arrangements taken in 1952: the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC’s aim was to facilitate the 
reconstruction of the most important industries that had been destroyed, while putting 
them under supranational control. On one side this particular set-up ensured France 
and Italy to have surveillance capabilities over relevant industrial sectors of the 
former enemy Germany and, at the same time, it gave Germany the opportunity to 
regain at least some say over relevant industries. According to Artis and Lee11, one 
other main feature of the ECSC was the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) with 
the aim of creating a common market, of removing any remaining barriers to trade, 
tariffs or quotas, and to modernise European industries while restricting subsidies. 
The ECSC was meant to provide the essential framework for reconciliation and 
rehabilitation between previous enemies.  
 
 
2.1 The Treaty of Rome, the EEC and Euratom 
 
One further important step in European integration was the signature of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. The Treaty of Rome gave birth to the European Economic Community 
(EEC), uniting the six founding members of the ECSC. The EEC advocated free 
movement of labour, a common customs policy and went further in its supranational 
institutional set-up. It aimed at deeper economic integration, especially through the 
introduction of joint policies, among others – or most prominently – the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP).  
 
                                                          
11 Artis and Lee (1997), ch. 1, p. 14 
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The EEC’s intention with respect to monetary integration was the establishment of a 
monetary zone with fixed exchange rates, harmonised macroeconomic policies and 
liberalised capital flows. Coordination in monetary matters was considered to be 
essential, considering that the end of the 1950s saw very different developments of 
inflation rates within European states.  
 
The judicial statutes of the EEC nevertheless did not mention the substitution of 
national currency by one single European currency. Nor did it envisage any specific 
new feature in exchange rate policies, as, according to Gros and Thygesen12, 
“exchange rate policy and balance of payment assistance (still) remained de facto an 
IMF domain” in times where Bretton Woods arrangements were still the dominant 
component of international monetary and exchange rate policies. Procedures 
enshrined in the Treaty of Rome aimed at complete elimination of balance of 
payments disequilibria and established a monetary committee with advisory status. 
Overall though the existence of the Bretton Woods system as the main monetary 
arrangement in the international monetary system did not make things urgent 
 
The early 1960s, i.e. the years just after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, were a 
stable period with fairly low unemployment and still relatively low trade linkages 
between EEC member states – the need for, or the potential impact of exchange rate 
changes, would consequently only have been very limited.  
 
However, with rising US deficits in the 1960-70s increasingly affecting Europe, 
European members of the Bretton Woods Agreement were not capable any more, 
nor willing to bring their respective economies in line with the USA or to respond 
adequately to the changing face of the world economy. The demise of the fixed 
exchange rate system under Bretton Woods opened up a period of turmoil in 
international financial relations, characterised by the re-emergence of beggar-thy-
neighbour policies and increased currency speculation. These developments had 
shown to European leaders that existing institutions had become inadequate, that a 
European answer had become necessary to react to this unstable environment and 
to ensure proper economic development. In this view, Barre13 proposed in 1968 the 
organisation of a monetary coordination mechanism between EEC member states.  
 
The Werner plan in 1970 – named after Luxembourg’s Minister of Finance – went 
even further and recommended a reduction of fluctuation margins of European 
currencies. Werner’s proposal aimed at deepening and widening the EEC with the 
ultimate goal of a monetary union to be established by 1980. The plan furthermore 
stressed the free movement of factors of production, but emphasised that “factor 
mobility would have to be supplemented by public financial transfers to avoid regional 
and structural disequilibria from arising.”14  
 
Such a monetary union would ultimately require the complete liberalisation of capital 
transactions, the full integration of banking and other financial markets and the 
irrevocable locking of exchange rate parities. Implementing this plan, however, would 
not necessarily have corresponded to the replacement of national currencies with 
                                                          
12 Gros and Thygesen (1998), ch. 1 
13 See Pelkmans (1997), ch. 2 
14 Gros and Thygesen (1998), ch.1, p. 13 
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one common currency and it did not recommend the establishment of a European 
central bank, but only a community system of European central banks. 
 
Comparing ideas as laid out under the Werner plan to later discussions on EMU in 
the early 1990s (i.e. the time of the Maastricht Treaty) two main differences stand out 
in addition to the relative neglect of institutional features and procedures: the Werner 
plan paid less attention to achieving economic (or fiscal) convergence and low 
inflation differentials in the short-run, because initial divergences among prospective 
participants were simply less visible than in the 1990s.  
The Werner plan’s proposals were however – in contrast to the Maastricht provisions 
– more concerned about the longer-run risk of divergence in economic performance 
and policies and consequently made more radically constraining proposals to put into 
place an EC authority to conduct budgetary policies at the Community level and it 
“even introduced some potential scope for a joint incomes policy.”15 
 
Overall in retrospect, a sound synchronisation of policies was not possible any more 
at a time of several major oil crises hitting the world economy, being responsible for 
European economies to diverge more and more one from the other. In addition to 
that Duwendag16 explained the failure of the Werner Plan to create a monetary union 
by the 1980s by the “too divergent views on monetary strategies and the missing 
willingness to concede national sovereignty” – it was therefore a too ambitious plan 
for this period. 
 
 
2.2 The “snake in the tunnel” 
 
Bretton Woods member states initially attempted to save their agreement by the 
Washington compromise agreed upon in December 1971. Its main result was the 
enlargement of fluctuation bands of participating currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar 
(USD). At the same time though, as soon as in 1971 the first exchange rate crisis 
broke out, European countries went further and envisioned the establishment of a 
fixed exchange rate mechanism within the existing system with even smaller margins 
of fluctuation.  
 
In March 1972, the six EEC countries decided to implement the first stage of their 
original plan, agreeing to restrict the deviation of their currencies to 2.25% on either 
side of existing EEC parities. This narrow band within the wider dollar band (4.5% on 
either side) became known as the “snake in the tunnel” arrangement, initiated after 
the Basel Accord of 1972. 
 
The snake achieved, at least initially, to preserve a minimum monetary order in 
Europe, even after the demise of the Bretton Woods Agreement. During most of its 
existence however the snake underwent turbulent times. As a response to the oil 
price shocks of 1973 and 1974 (see below Tables 1 and 2 for inflation and growth 
rate developments in this period) and due to divergent policy reactions by European 
states, respecting the fluctuation margins became more and more difficult for several 
countries and several parity adaptations were necessary to further commit to a fully 
functioning and stable exchange rate system. 
                                                          
15 Gros and Thygesen (1998), ch. 1, p. 13 
16 Duwendag (1999), ch. 1  
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Table 1: Inflation rates (%); various countries; various years 
 
  1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Belgium 3.9 4.3 5.4 6.9 12.7 
Denmark 6.5 5.8 6.5 9.3 15.3 
France 5.3 5.4 6.1 7.4 13.6 
Germany 3.5 5.2 5.5 7 6.9 
Italy 4.9 4.8 5.7 10.8 19.1 
Luxembourg 4.6 4.7 5.2 6.1 9.5 
Netherlands 3.7 7.57 7.8 8 9.6 
United 
Kingdom 6.4 9.4 7.1 9.2 16 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
Table 2: Real GDP growth rates; var. countries  
 
  1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Belgium 6.2 3.8 5.3 6.1 4.2 -1.3
Denmark  1.5 3.0 4.2 3.8 -0.8 -1.2
Germany  5.0 3.3 4.1 4.6 0.5 -1.0
France  5.7 4.8 4.4 5.4 3.1 -0.3
Italy  5.3 1.8 3.7 7.1 5.5 -2.1
Luxembourg  1.7 2.7 6.6 8.3 4.2 -6.6
Netherlands  5.7 4.4 2.7 4.9 4.1 0.2
United 
Kingdom  2.2 2.0 3.6 7.1 -1.4 -0.6
 
Source: European Commission AMECO Database 
 
 
 
2.3 The failure of the monetary snake 
 
In June 1972 the UK gave up on its monetary stability engagements to which it had 
previously subscribed, following a severe external balance crisis. In June 1973, it was 
the turn of the Italian lira to leave the system and to start to float freely. The same 
happened to France which had difficulties to surmount its balance of payments 
problems in the period that followed the 1st oil price shock in 1973, forcing it to let the 
French franc leave the system twice, from January 1974 to July 1975 and from March 
1976 to April 1979 (i.e. until the start of the European Monetary System). Considering 
the difficulties that currencies other than the deutschmark met, one can in retrospect 
very well conclude that the monetary snake had predominantly been a deutschmark 
zone. One of the dominant reasons for the failure of the snake was the missing level 
of policy coordination, the fact that countries reacted very differently to external 
shocks and that they were faced with divergent inflation levels.  
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2.4 Towards the European Monetary System (EMS) 
 
In July 1978 the European Council in Bremen discussed potential reforms of the 
monetary snake and laid the ground for the creation of EMS in the following year. It 
was commonly agreed that EMS – besides being a result of economic common 
sense – had political origins as well and that EMS was an attempt to resume 
monetary integration at a time when two groups of countries had emerged in Europe. 
Germany wanted to use monetary integration as a means to stabilise the European 
trading environment while France opted to pursue EMS together with Germany 
inspired by the Schmidt-d’Estaing initiative17 to obtain more economic power and to 
prevent being left out of the process of European economic integration. Italy on the 
other hand partly recognised deepened integration as a means to inhibit or contain 
communist tendencies within the country and to restructure the Italian economy.  
 
Overall though the European consensus was that EMS would become a decisive 
step for Europe to become more independent vis-à-vis the USA. 
 
Policy makers according to Gros and Thygesen18 had in mind to create a “zone of 
monetary stability” with a “fixed but adjustable exchange rate system”, which was 
hoped – to say the least – to be at least as stable as the monetary snake and which 
should become the right response to the unprecedented inflation and exchange rate 
fluctuations of the 1970s while contributing to further convergence of European 
economies. 
 
The EMS with exchange rates centred around a basket mechanism “was seen as 
requiring much less effort in non-monetary areas, because it was ‘only’ – even in its 
subsequent stage after the set-up of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(EMCF) – a limited, defensive mechanism to improve monetary stability.”19  
Policy coordination in areas outside of the monetary sphere was not envisaged (i.e. 
compared to the pre EMU-debate in the 1980s and 1990s, no trade or budgetary 
policy coordination or policy rules were applied, nor were any plans made for the 
implementation of a larger community budget). EMS “didn’t require the elimination of 
international policy divergences, but the ERM was designed to accommodate the 
different policies pursued”20 i.e. some countries were permitted higher fluctuation 
bands and realignments were a possibility in case balance of payments imbalances 
went out of control:  
EMS was eventually established in 1979 and incorporated all EEC currencies, with 
the sole exception of the British pound. The United Kingdom did not initially join the 
system and Ireland and Italy only after much discussion, but only under special 
conditions: The fluctuation bands of their currencies were fixed to be of +/- 6%.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 See Artis and Lee (1997), ch. 1, p. 14 ff. or Schubert (1996) 
18 Gros and Thygesen (1998), ch. 2, p. 35 ff. 
19 Gros and Thygesen (1998), ch. 2, p. 51 ff.. 
20 Eichengreen (1993), (p. 1324) 
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Some of the main characteristics and principals of EMS were summarised by Gros 
and Thygesen21 and Part22 as follows: 
 
- Exchange rates and intervention mechanisms: the aim of EMS was relative 
currency stability; the ecu was at the centre of the system as a means of 
settlement; currency market interventions were necessary and required, if the 
currency left the parity grid (in general 2.25% or 6% for Ireland and Italy); a 
later entry into the system was possible; adaptations were only possible if 
mutually agreed; mutual consultation on important exchange rate policy 
decisions was necessary. 
- Credit and assistance systems: different credit facilities of central banks were: 
very short-term, short-term and medium-term interventions.  
- The ecu acted as weighted currency basket, as numéraire and as settlement 
currency (or reserve instrument) between central banks. 
- A settlement mechanism was introduced with 20% of gold and USD to be 
exchanged with the EMCF. 
- In case an exchange rate reached the fluctuation margins, central banks on 
both sides were obliged to intervene to ensure a “return to normalcy” either 
through direct intervention on the foreign exchange rate market (i.e. through 
the use of ecu or US-Dollar reserves or through the buying up / selling of 
reserves to / from fellow central banks), through credits from the EMCF or 
through a commonly agreed modification of the central rate23. This reciprocity 
in market interventions constituted an important innovation compared to the 
monetary snake, where only the central bank of the “weak” currency would 
have to (re)act and intervene. 
 
Internal stability within and through EMS 
 
Following the oil price shocks in the 1970s, European countries just like most OECD 
countries went through a period of excessive price developments. With the 
Bundesbank meeting the best results in fighting inflation and given the importance of 
the German economy in Europe, it was clear that other member states would be 
“inspired” by or try to tie their respective monetary policies to German monetary 
policy. The result of common anti-inflation policies was a remarkable period of 
disinflation (despite national differences), as can be seen in Table 3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Gros and Thygesen (1998), ch.  3, p. 65 ff. 
22 Part (1993), p. 42 
23 See Artis and Lee (1997) ch. 12 for a more detailed explanation 
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Table 3: Inflation rates; various countries; various years; Source: OECD 
 
  1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Austria 7.3 5.5 3.5 3.7 6.3 6.8 5.4 3.3 5.6 3.2 1.7 1.4 1.9 2.6
Belgium 9.1 7.1 4.5 4.5 6.6 7.6 8.7 7.7 6.4 4.9 1.3 1.5 1.2 3.1
Denmark 9 10.9 10.2 9.6 12.3 11.8 10.1 6.9 6.3 4.7 3.7 4 4.5 4.8
France 9.6 9.5 9.3 10.6 13.6 13.3 11.9 9.5 7.7 5.8 2.5 3.3 2.7 3.5
Germany 4.2 3.7 2.7 4 5.4 6.3 5.2 3.3 2.4 2.1 -0.1 0.3 1.3 2.8
Greece 13 12.4 12.6 19.1 24.7 24.5 21 20.1 18.5 19.3 23 16.4 13.5 13.6
Ireland 17.8 13.5 7.7 13.3 18.2 20.4 17.1 10.5 8.6 5.5 3.8 3.2 2.1 4.1
Italy 16.6 17.1 12.1 14.8 21.1 17.9 16.5 14.6 10.8 9.2 5.8 4.7 5.1 6.3
Luxembourg 9.8 6.7 3.1 4.5 6.3 8.1 9.4 8.7 6.4 4.1 0.3 -0.1 1.4 3.4
Netherlands 8.8 6.4 4.1 4.2 6.5 6.7 5.9 2.7 3.3 2.3 0.1 -0.7 0.7 1.1
Portugal 21.1 33.1 22.6 23.6 16.6 20 22.7 25.1 28.9 19.6 11.8 9.4 9.6 12.7
Spain 17.6 24.5 19.8 15.7 15.6 14.5 14.4 12.2 11.3 8.8 8.8 5.2 4.8 6.8
United Kingdom 16.6 15.8 8.3 13.4 17.9 11.9 8.6 4.6 4.9 6.1 3.4 4.1 4 5.2
 
 
The strengthening of policy coordination between EMS countries took place in the 
form of aligning currencies ‘around the head of the table’ Germany. The deutschmark 
effectively used to be the anchor of the system, supported by a highly inflation-
adverse German Bundesbank. According to Giavazzi and Giovannini24 "EMS, like the 
gold standard and the Bretton Woods system, is characterized by a 'centre' country 
Germany whose central bank pursues its own monetary targets independently of the 
policies pursued by the other members. The other countries, which have to a 
significant extent converged to Germany's monetary policies, have maintained limited 
independence by the systematic use of capital controls, and the adoption of periodic 
exchange rate devaluations."  
 
A reservation however must be made to any statement claiming that Germany was 
fully independent of any other country’s policy actions or deviation in economic 
fundamentals. On the contrary there is agreement to the fact that Germany suffered 
from imported inflation from high inflation countries like Italy. It appears however that 
Germany achieved more stability in its real effective exchange rate by joining the 
EMS, especially vis-à-vis the US-Dollar.  
 
With regard to inflation differentials within EMS, certain countries kept substantial 
inflation differentials in comparison with Germany (see Table 3 further above):  
Italy and Spain for instance – while achieving significant inflation reduction over the 
1980s – never had inflation rates that were as close as 2% to the lowest-inflation 
countries of the system in the period between 1979 and 1993. Exactly these 
countries were those that suffered most from the EMS crises in 1992 and 1993.  
 
Improved but uncompleted convergence in inflation differences was, among others, 
tested by Gros and Thygesen who made an empirical analysis of the success of 
EMS. Using IMF International Financial Statistics they reached the conclusion that 
there was an “inflation variability reduction but not more than under Bretton 
Woods”25. Comparing member states and non-members, they concluded that EMS 
                                                          
24 Giavazzi and Giovannini (1988), pp. 10 ff. 
25 Gros and Thygesen (1998), ch. 4 , p. 114 ff. 
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members fared well in later stages and that cohesion between member states was 
higher than between non-members and, e.g., Germany. Non-members were found to 
be converging too, but only towards higher overall average inflation rates. EMS 
therefore did manage to work as a disciplining device and did manage to reduce the 
cost of disinflation.  
 
Exchange rate stability 
 
In an international monetary system characterised by large exchange rate 
fluctuations in both the short- and long-run, EMS members were able to maintain a 
certain stability of parities between their currencies. Until 1992, nominal exchange 
rates evolved progressively towards greater stability. Parity realignments did take 
place and did come at a fairly frequent rate: 13 could be counted for the period 
between March 1979 and March 1992; their amplitude however was limited with 
respect to currency variations with respect to “third” currencies, such as the yen or 
the US-Dollar.  
 
Overall, the history of EMS can generally be divided into four different stages (the 
fourth being the EMS crises themselves): 
 
- The initial period of 1979-1983 can, in retrospect, be referred to as the “turbulent” 
phase, because seven exchange rate adjustments took place within this relatively 
short period of time. This period was characterised by tightened monetary policy in 
the USA and consequently high American interest rates. European policy makers 
faced the dilemma of either following the US and raising interest rates, or to allow 
their currencies to depreciate. The late 1970s and early 1980s were also a period of 
high inflation following the oil price shocks, with prices soaring while output levels fell 
and unemployment rates rose to unprecedented levels, leading policy makers to turn 
their attention towards deficit spending.  
 
Currency realignments taking place were nevertheless not solely aimed at bringing 
economies into line just by themselves. They were also “linked to domestic policy 
adjustments, which made longer-term convergence feasible” (e.g. price and wage 
freezes)26. 
 
- The following years, i.e. the period between 1983 and 1987, were in comparison 
calmer with five realignments taking place, with 28 months being the longest period 
of stability. Emphasis was laid on nominal convergence of economies and 
coordination of – especially – monetary policies. These four years were a period of 
lower average inflation (as compared to the previous period) and of budgetary 
tightening. The UK under the Thatcher government became one of the prime 
examples of strongly restrictive budgetary policies and of a strong focus on fighting 
inflation and undertaking necessary steps to achieve budgetary consolidation, even 
at the expense of rising unemployment levels.  
 
- In retrospect, the third period was the most stable period in the history of the EMS. 
Between 1987 and 1992, only one exchange rate realignment took place (see below) 
and EMS was even enlarged. EMS member states achieved a fairly sufficient degree 
of convergence in inflation and interest rates and achieved to maintain these. 
                                                          
26 Gros and Thygesen (1998), ch. 3, pp. 81 ff. 
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Monetary coordination was strengthened, foundations for the removal of remaining 
capital restrictions were laid by the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 and major 
economic reforms were undertaken to move towards EMU by a step-by-step 
approach.  
At the time it appeared that EMS had become a system of quasi-fixed exchange 
rates, as no realignment took place during this period, except for the January 1990 
lira devaluation of 3.7%. Its aim was to allow Italy to enter smaller ERM fluctuation 
margins. This ‘new EMS’ with relatively stable exchange rates can be regarded in 
retrospect as helping to smooth the way towards EMU. The smooth functioning of 
EMS in these years can perfectly be combined with the logic of the moment that 
principally relied on the following elements: 
 
- The enthusiasm that gave rise to a new perspective emerging in European 
economic policy making, i.e. the perspective of a monetary union.  
- The second element being a consequence of the institutional improvements of 
EMS following the adoption of the Basel-Nyborg agreements in 1987. After the 
signature of these agreements, the basic understanding of the functioning of 
EMS was improved in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The choice of interest 
rates as policy objectives was positively judged by markets, as it benefited 
from a more symmetric administration of potential tensions in the ERM, even if 
it entailed greater interest rate volatility.  
- In addition, the late 1980s were a period marked by a progressive 
liberalisation of capital movements, as envisaged by the Single European Act. 
Goals of the SEA, according to Pelkmans27, were a widening and deepening 
of the institutional framework of the European Community, a codification of 
existing cooperation and the completion of the Single European Market.  
 
 
2.5 Towards the EMS crises 
 
The continuation of a smoothly functioning operation mode within EMS relied on the 
synchronisation of business cycles in Europe, especially between Germany and the 
other member states of the Community, as well as a synchronisation of the economic 
fundamentals.  
 
As we have seen, the room of manoeuvre of national monetary policies was reduced 
in EMS in a way that interest rates could not be changed to such a level that would 
take into account internal adjustment needs without questioning the external parity 
level vis-à-vis the leader of the table, i.e. Germany. This inability to manoeuvre 
strengthened credibility gains in the short-run, but brought instability in the medium- 
and long-run. To illustrate this, one has to look at the example of Spain, which 
seemingly had benefited ever since its entry into the EMS, despite its high inflation 
rate. Massive capital inflows, though, led to an appreciation of the peseta. Spain 
consequently did not benefit with a real improvement of its inflationary performance. 
In addition, the appreciation of the exchange rate led to a strong deterioration of 
Spain’s external accounts. This situation gradually led to a credibility loss of the 
peseta within EMS. Exchange markets started to anticipate that Spain would only 
have the alternative to push the emergency button and to leave the system, as 
actually did happen eventually.  
                                                          
27 See Pelkmans (1997), ch. 3 
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With respect to the synchronisation of business cycles, German re-unification 
constituted a massive shock for the whole of Europe. Re-unification and the 
conflicting policy-mix that was chosen by German authorities in its aftermath 
deteriorated Germany’s anchor position within EMS. Certain views at the time stated 
that a partly and transitory revaluation of the deutschmark could have been a solution 
to alleviate Germany’s demand surplus without accelerating inflation. A currency 
realignment however could have been interpreted as an abandonment of the way 
economic policy was chosen until that very moment. This was the reason why many 
countries, above all France, opposed such a possibility. The deutschmark-anchor 
consequently became contested: a conflict emerged between, on one side, Germany 
having to fight inflationary pressures and its partner states having to face 
recessionary tendencies with rising unemployment rates. The German “high interest 
rate policy” was criticised by partner states, both by those with sound fundamentals 
(like France) and those confronted with serious difficulties due to public (Italy) or 
private debt (UK).  
 
German re-unification and the policy dilemma faced by European states in its 
aftermath – a time of a quasi fixity of exchange rate parities and the progress made 
towards a European Internal Market with free capital movement – were giving an 
example of the incompatibility triangle EMS participants were facing: free capital 
circulation, exchange rate fixity and monetary policy autonomy. All these elements 
eventually led the EMS to enter difficult and instable times that culminated in several 
exchange rate crises between 1992 and 1993 (i.e. the last of the four EMS stages).  
 
While the ‘new EMS’ was characterised by a quasi fixity of parities and while the 
removal of capital controls in 1990 was the final step towards a full liberalisation of 
capital movements and an important aspect of the Single Market in Europe, the 
question of how to proceed with monetary policy coordination became crucial. 
Monetary policy coordination had been of a particular kind: it was taking a minimal 
and, above all, constrained form: policy alignment with the leading country. The 
coordination mode that had always prevailed in the system was indeed directly 
inspired by the German Bundesbank.  
The alternative to not aligning would have possibly been punished by markets 
through speculative (and probably unsustainable) exchange rate parity attacks. In 
general, from the moment onwards where leadership is contested, the coordination 
constraint is not credible anymore, which was exactly what happened after German 
re-unification where fighting inflationary tendencies became an absolute priority. On 
the other hand, partner countries had other preferences explained by different 
domestic policy priorities that put national economies under immense pressure to 
devaluate: weak growth and rising unemployment. Economically, with countries being 
in debt and recession, perceptions by markets that currencies were overvalued was 
unavoidable, eventually leading to large speculative capital inflows in September 
1992, the leaving of the exchange rate mechanism by the lira and the pound and the 
widening of fluctuation bands to 15% in August 1993.  
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The liberalisation of capital movements 
 
The liberalisation of capital flows and the consequently higher feasibility of 
speculative attacks (with sometimes even auto-realising character) moved EMS 
towards the impossibility triangle.  
First of all, the liberalisation of capital movements translated quite logically into an 
amplification of the volume of trans-border capital movements that surpassed the 
level of exchange reserves that could potentially be mobilised to counter such an 
attack. The alternative for a country whose currency losses became unsupportable 
was simple and easily anticipated by the market: either the country in question would 
let its currency depreciate, or it would raise its interest rate even further and therefore 
risk even higher capital inflow at a time where EMS interest rates were already at 
high levels in post-re-unification Germany.   
 
The process of self-fulfilling speculation could mainly be observed in countries whose 
public debt level was relatively high, i.e. Italy and Spain. Higher interest rates in these 
countries would have translated into unsustainably high debt payment costs for the 
corresponding governments. Markets therefore perceived these governments to be 
susceptible to renounce the maintenance of exchange rate parities and saw some 
scope for successful currency speculation and speculative gains.  
 
In September 1992, a speculative wave had developed in favour of the deutschmark 
and against the lira and the pound sterling. These two currencies left the EMS on  
17 September 1992 and started to float freely. The crisis also reached France but 
joint interventions by the Banque de France and the Bundesbank managed to 
counter this movement. In late autumn 1992 speculative attacks started again – this 
time against the peseta and the escudo, which were devalued in November 1992. 
The overall credibility of maintaining parities therefore was hit by a massive blow. The 
year 1993 started with the devaluation of the Irish pound (30 January), while several 
countries had to maintain, despite unfavourable business cycle developments, their 
high interest rate levels.  
 
In July 1993 a new speculative wave touched the remaining member states: attacks 
were at first directed at the French franc, the Belgian franc and the Danish krona. 
Eventually EMS members decided on 1 August 1993 to widen the fluctuation bands 
to +/-15%, which stopped speculation, but corresponded to a quasi “blowing up” of 
EMS. As a consequence, the EMS exchange rate regime became more and more 
like a general floating system, rather than a regime of fixed exchange rates.  
 
 
2.6 The Treaty of the European Union and political circumstances as catalysts of the 
EMS currency crises 
 
The appearance of convergence criteria defined in the Maastricht Treaty that was 
signed in February 1992 concerned on one side monetary criteria (price stability, 
interest rate stability and exchange rate stability) and on the other side budgetary 
criteria (public deficit and debt levels).  
 
The first mentioning of such criteria allowed agents for the first time to evaluate 
efforts undertaken by the different countries to participate at the third stage of EMU, 
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the phase that was decisive to the instalment of a single currency and the setting-up 
of a European Central Bank.  
The TEU therefore insisted on, at least some form of, policy coherence, while EMS 
had only relied on a certain ‘dissociation’ of monetary and fiscal policies.  
 
One can say that beyond their simple definition, the convergence criteria had an 
announcement effect that has modified the qualitative content of the notion of 
credibility. Until their introduction in the TEU, credibility depended on financial 
markets’ judgment with respect to the authorities’ ability to maintain exchange rate 
parity. With the convergence criteria in place, credibility depended on parity 
maintenance and budgetary stability. Overall, the risk of loosing credibility depended 
on three factors: 
 
- The criteria revealed that those countries that had benefited most from ‘new 
EMS’ credibility (i.e. Italy and Spain) were precisely those that found 
themselves in relatively delicate positions regarding the Maastricht criteria (i.e. 
with respect to high inflation and predominant budgetary situations). 
- In retrospect, the appearance also shed light on the harmful dynamic initiated 
by the ‘new EMS’ with respect to budgetary objectives. In the period 1989-
1993, the majority of European countries had seen their budgetary positions 
deteriorate with regard to the announced Maastricht criteria. The dynamism 
that the TEU was supposed to call forth somehow appeared to contradict the 
one that prevailed in the case of the ‘new EMS’. 
- The definition of the criteria was unclear and left some room for interpretation. 
 
Even if it can only be interpreted as a catalyst of the crises, the negative result of the 
Danish referendum on the TEU on 2 June 1992 has often been identified as 
contributing to the currency crises of EMS. The Danish “no-vote” was interpreted by 
markets as the first signal that EMU would only be a possibility and not necessarily a 
certainty. The Danish vote was a decisive shock in times when euphoria around the 
project of EMU peeked. The very small majority at the French referendum in autumn 
1992 could not reassure markets either. This overall credibility loss added to the 
problem of policy coordination, which was considered to become even more relevant 
in view of the consequences that German re-unification had on Europe. The business 
cycle ‘conflict’ between a German government fighting inflation and its partners, who 
were confronted with slower growth and rising unemployment was more and more 
felt by the markets. The alignment of monetary policy to German leadership was 
viewed to be less and less tenable and therefore appeared less credible than before.  
 
The consequences of the EMS currency crises on the way towards EMU  
 
Even though the above described currency crises led to the end of the EMS, they did 
not compromise the pursuit towards monetary union. The crises did not primarily 
affect the institutional progress of EMU either, considering that the Stage-approach 
borne in mind for EMU was unaffected. The second stage of January 1994 saw the 
creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), whose prime objective was to 
prepare the passage towards a single currency and the coordination of monetary 
policy in the run-up period. The currency crises did not affect either the operational 
phase that was crucial for the setting up of EMU: the creation of the ECB – the 
institution in charge of executing monetary policy and of undertaking the physical 
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introduction of the euro, the main elements of Stage III of EMU. These took place on 
1 January 1999 and 1 January 2002 respectively.   
 
From this point of view one could argue that the crises had been serving the 
realisation of EMU. They had somehow ‘cleaned up’ the exchange mechanisms, 
allowing the monetary integration process to go further with parities that were better 
adapted to respective economic conditions. The widening of fluctuation bands after 
1993 introduced a certain ease that was found to be indispensable. The unbalancing 
role of speculative attacks could be reduced as a consequence. In 1996, the chosen 
strategy had finally revealed itself as worthwhile, as exchange rate volatility and 
short-run interest rate differentials were reduced.  
 
Finally, the EMS exchange rate crises led to the following conclusions to be borne in 
mind:  
 
- The currency crises were the consequence of the incompatibility of perfectly 
mobile capital, exchange rate fixity and monetary policy autonomy. They 
legitimised the project of monetary union, founded on the adoption of a single 
currency and a single monetary policy. EMU became an illustration of being 
the sole solution according to the incompatibility triangle.  
- The second lesson learnt concerned the conditions of smooth functioning of a 
monetary union. The crises reminded us that it was dangerous to prematurely 
follow a monetary union process with too heterogeneous economies. This 
meant that the participation of countries that have not converged enough 
could potentially weaken the system. In such a case it would have been in the 
interest of any country to voluntarily stay out of the system, just as it initially 
seemed for Greece to be the case until it had improved its economic 
fundamentals. This could also become relevant in the case of the newer EU 
member states that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007 and that aim at joining 
the eurozone in the near future. Staying out would mean for them that they 
could potentially keep the exchange rate as an adjustment instrument; it would 
signify that aggregate demand would be more sensible to exchange rate or 
short-run interest rate variations; it would finally mean that business cycles 
could be converging, and structural reforms easier to undertake. 
- The third lesson relates to the former: aiming for convergence was a 
necessary condition for the success of EMU. The TEU criteria possibly were 
not the best – being focused solely on monetary and financial questions – but 
they showed at least the necessity of convergence of potential EMU member 
states.  
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3. The European Monetary Union – the historical context and theoretical 
considerations 
 
Before continuing our review of EMU on historical grounds, it is useful to look at 
economic theory in order to explain why countries would agree to give up their 
currencies and monetary autonomy for a single currency and for a single monetary 
policy conducted by a supranational institution. For this reason this section will shortly 
compare benefits and costs of joining such a monetary union before presenting the 
most important economic literature on the subject. The basis for theoretically 
reviewing monetary unions is, according to Verdun28, the Optimum Currency Area 
Theory that undertakes a Cost-Benefit Analysis on whether a country should join a 
monetary union. 
 
From the point of view of economic theory there are several arguments why 
sovereign states might agree to give up some levels of sovereignty and join a 
currency area with one single monetary authority. In the European context, with its 
strong emphasis on free trade, perfect capital mobility (both essential ingredients of 
the Single Market) and fixed exchange rates, identified by Mundell29 as the 
“incompatibility triangle”, conducting autonomous monetary policy is not feasible 
anymore, as a mere fixing of exchange rates without sufficient credibility behind it 
would make the system potentially victim of speculative attacks, something we have 
witnessed under the EMS. The only logical consequence for Europe therefore was 
completing monetary unification, as recommended by the Delors Committee Report 
in 1989. Returning to a floating exchange rate system would have thrown away all 
previous efforts of monetary integration and would have threatened a fair and stable 
competitive economic environment that was thought to be ensured by fixed exchange 
rates. Replacing national currencies would ultimately prevent competitive 
devaluations from taking place – this especially was of great interest in view of the 
Common Agricultural Policy Programme, whose aim was setting common prices for 
European agricultural goods.   
 
Moving towards European monetary unification and EMU however unsurprisingly led 
to an intensive debate about the desirability and correctness of the move – especially 
from an academic point of view30.  
On one side, proponents argued that, economically, EMU would be the logical next 
step to complete the Single Market; on the other side – mainly euro-sceptical 
economists such as Eichengreen (2002)31 and other American academics pointed 
out that EMU was an “enterprise decided upon political economy grounds”, i.e. a 
political rather than a (sensible) economic decision.  
 
The geo-strategic situation had changed with a re-unified (bigger and more powerful) 
Germany and surely contributed to other EC states aiming at tying Germany closer to 
Europe. At the same time these countries were benefiting from a system in which 
monetary policy domination by the German Bundesbank. The asymmetric functioning 
and German dictation of ERM were therefore reduced, even though the ECB with its 
strict inflation policy objective even nowadays looks more similar to the Bundesbank 
                                                          
28 Verdun (2002), p. 169 ff. 
29 Mundell (1961) 
30 See for instance Bleyer (1997) 
31 Eichengreen (2002) 
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then any other pre-EMU central bank. Finally, for high-inflation countries (e.g. Spain 
or Italy), EMU remained the ultimate discipline and convergence device.  
 
Germany, on the other hand, only agreed to give in under the condition that the 
future central bank would be hard-nosed with price stability being its main policy 
objective, characteristics that fit well for the first President (Duisenberg) and Board of 
Directors members (like Issing).  
 
 
3.1  Theory on Monetary Unions 
 
 
3.1.1 Gains from adopting a single currency – general and EMU specific 
 
- The suppression of exchange rates would eliminate any exchange rate risk and 
exchange rate uncertainty negatively affecting trade, foreign direct investments 
and employment in export areas. Such an elimination of risks and uncertainty32 
would reduce interest rates and interest rate differentials; every member of the 
currency union therefore gains from capital savings that were normally dedicated 
to cover that risk. A stable exchange rate would help to accrue all remaining 
benefits from a Single Market Programme. Introducing a single currency in 
Europe can therefore be regarded as the logical last step of a unified European 
economic area. Especially countries like Italy highly benefited from adhering to 
EMU, as adherence removed any risk premium on interest rates due to the fact 
that Italy faced the same ECB interest rate as all the other member states. Italy’s 
move towards EMU was not only credible in the eyes of agents and exchange 
rate markets, but it also helped to “cure” Italian public finances. 
- Direct transaction costs from trans-border monetary and trade operations that go 
in hand with exchange operations would also be eliminated. The European 
Commission estimated that 0.5-1%33 of the EU’s GDP would be saved after the 
creation of EMU in terms of conversion cost.  
- A monetary union would be beneficial to the integration of financial markets: 
buying euro-denominated stocks would not anymore be negatively influenced by 
exchange rate risks. Increased capital mobility would also oblige financial 
intermediaries to harmonise credit conditions more to the favour of consumers.  
- The dependency on the US interest rate would be likely to fall with a strong 
European currency and economic area34.  
- A monetary union would translate into official reserve savings, as theorised by 
Robert Mundell35. The use of exchange reserves would only become necessary in 
relation to trade with countries external to the monetary union.  
- Information gains related to the fact that prices denoted in only one currency 
create economies of scale. Comparability of prices for consumers and economic 
agents would be improved, the likelihood of price discrimination would be 
eliminated and market segmentation would be reduced. 
                                                          
32 See also Menger (1892) 
33 Estimates vary according to sources and authors; Gros and Thygesen (1998) for instance estimate the effect to 
be around 1%. 
34 See Ochel (1996) 
35 Mundell (1961) and Mundell (1973) 
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- A single monetary policy would not only be “led” by one member state central 
bank (as under EMS), but it would rather be co-decided by a supranational body 
with representatives from all member states. This would potentially solve the 
inflation-bias problem and induce inflation convergence towards the lower end – if 
this supranational body, to which monetary policy has been delegated to, had a 
sufficient degree of credibility in its conduction of monetary policy36. With the 
necessary political will, right institutions and mandates, this would also prevent 
the monetarisation of debt.  
Pure supranationality however did not and does not completely apply to EMU: the 
ECB, despite being independent from member state pressure, was clearly built 
after the German role model of the Bundesbank.  
- A monetary union would have more negotiation power37 in international economic 
fora, like the WTO and the common currency would become an alternative to the 
US-Dollar, which is the case with EMU and the euro.  
- Competitive devaluations of national currencies and the so-called “devaluation-
inflation-spiral”38 would be eliminated in case countries agreed to replace their 
currencies with a single currency.  
- The presence of a single currency in a monetary union containing a vast number 
of countries would make speculative attacks less likely, as response mechanisms 
by the authorities of such a union would work better than in the case of the EMS 
crises that has been described further above.  
 
 
3.1.2 Costs of adopting a single currency 
 
The literature on currency unions39 identifies the loss of monetary autonomy and the 
loss of the exchange rate as a policy tool to be the most important costs of joining a 
monetary union. To smooth or counter the negative side-effects of the former, the 
supranational central bank would have to attempt to average out the member states’ 
needs in terms of inflation preferences in its policy reaction (for instance in case of an 
adverse shock hitting the monetary union). This, however, considering the 
heterogeneous characteristics of EMU member states, did not and does not always 
prevail for the eurozone.  
 
With regard to the loss of the exchange rate policy tool, one would have to ask how 
efficient variations in exchange rates were as shock absorbers40. They would be 
effective relative to wage-price reactions in the short-run. Devaluations could be 
somewhat effective, but their effectiveness would be constrained to the short-run, 
assuming that wages and in particular prices were sluggish and only more flexible in 
the longer-run41. The problem of not being able to use the exchange rate tool would 
become particularly serious if wages were rigid, labour mobility low and labour 
market institutions would differ significantly, conditions that still apply to today’s 
Europe and eurozone economies.  
                                                          
36 See, for instance, Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
37 See Ochel (1996) 
38 Jarchow et al. (2002) 
39 Starting with Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), Ingram (1969), etc. 
40 See, for instance, Sachs (1984), for a critique of the efficiency of the ER as a policy tool to adjust to external 
shocks.  
41 Artis and Lee (1997) 
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The above argument especially applied to EMU members, which, in case they were 
exposed to asymmetric shocks, could no longer adjust their individual exchange rate. 
One could counter-argue though that it would just be as questionable that a flexible 
exchange rate would be able to offset such adverse economic shocks. Mundell42 
stated that flexible rates might also be undesirable, if, for example, there were two 
different regions within each country (i.e. one booming, one in recession). A change 
of the exchange rate would therefore not help.  
 
 
3.2 Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theories 
 
Optimum Currency Area theories offer some insight on the economic reasoning 
behind monetary union, trying to combine the above mentioned cost vs. benefits 
arguments. OCA theories identify conditions that need to be satisfied in order to 
make it economically worthwhile for a country or a region to join a currency area. For 
a country or region to join such a union, certain adaptation mechanisms would need 
to be implemented or ensured and member states of the currency union should 
satisfy similar entry criteria.  
 
Mongelli43 for instance offers a good introduction and overview of the basic economic 
literature and the different phases of OCA Theory: 
 
 
3.2.1 The “pioneering phase” of OCAT with contributions from Mundell, 
McKinnon, Kenen: 
 
a) Mundell’s labour mobility criterion 
 
The Optimum Currency Area theory was first introduced by Robert Mundell44. 
According to him, an “OCA is the only area where it is possible to install a single 
currency.” The main criterion to ensure optimality of the currency area is perfect 
mobility of labour.  
 
In Mundell’s view, defining whether or not a monetary union were optimal, would be  
the same as looking if the regions of this union were characterised by perfect mobility 
of labour. In his model, Mundell gave the example of the two regions A and B and 
cited the example of a shift in demand to the benefit of B (and detriment of A). 
Mundell’s assumptions included short-run price and wage rigidities and perfect labour 
mobility. In a hypothetical case presented by him, falling demand for products in 
region A would translate into rising unemployment in that region. Since, by 
assumption, prices and wage adjustments were impossible, only factor movement 
from A to B would make unemployment disappear in A. This would signify that inter-
regional labour movements (or capital) could be substitutes to exchange rate 
modifications and act as a stabilising force which is needed in the absence of 
exchange rate flexibility.  
 
                                                          
42 Mundell (1961) 
43 Mongelli (2002)  
44 Mundell (1961) 
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If however the countries had flexible exchange rates, a depreciation could occur in 
the country with high unemployment. 
 
In a currency union, with countries being affected differently by external shocks, a 
policy response by the supranational central bank could therefore lead to different 
outcomes in the corresponding countries. For instance, a counter-inflation policy 
could have depressing effects in lower inflation, but higher unemployment regions. If, 
therefore, asymmetric shocks were to hit the union, countries would consequently 
have to accept higher unemployment or higher inflation, given that there was no more 
possibility of using the exchange rate tool, to have monetary policy autonomy or if 
wages and prices were rigid and factors of production immobile.  
 
Within the currency zone exchange rates are fixed, but flexible with respect to the 
rest of the world. Mundell therefore insisted on the importance of labour mobility or 
wage flexibility in the adjustment processes to an external shock or external 
disequilibrium.  
 
Mundell’s reasoning on regions and on labour mobility was criticised by many 
authors, who stress that with inter-regional labour mobility already being weak, this 
criterion would reduce the OCA to a very small area only: under this point of view, 
Kenen argued that "Mundell’s approach leads to the sad conclusion that an OCA 
always has to be small."45 
 
b) The diversification criterion of the economy  
 
Peter Kenen46dropped the hypothesis of mono-production (as used initially by 
Mundell) and considered regions with highly diversified economies, producing a great 
variety of goods and services. The nature of the economies implied a diversified 
export pattern. Kenen argued that factor mobility would not be the only OCA criterion, 
but that other criteria would also come into play. In his view the ”diversity in a nation’s 
product mix, the number of single-product regions contained in a single country, may 
be more relevant than labour mobility.”47 However, the corresponding country would 
need sufficient occupational mobility to reabsorb idle labour and capital (or otherwise 
one would not achieve domestic stability).  
 
Overall, a diversified economy “would have less necessity to adjust to a sectoral 
shock, but greater ability to adjust”48. According to Part49, the Single Market would 
increase the possibilities of substitution and intra-industrial division of labour.   
In such a diversified and open export economy, negative demand effects on one 
good would only marginally affect the total level of exports and therefore the impact 
on employment would only be negligible and external shocks should average out 
over the different sectors. A diversified region therefore would not need to undertake 
exchange rate readjustments and could choose to adopt fixed exchange rates, while 
                                                          
45 Kenen (1969) 
46 Kenen (1969) and (1995) 
47 Kenen (1969), pp. 49 ff. 
48 Radü (1994), ch. 5, pp. 160 ff. 
49 Part (1993) 
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a very weakly diversified economy necessarily would have to be interdependent and 
would need flexible exchange rates to react to business cycle instabilities50.    
 
Kocher’s analysis51 on Austria’s economy during the time of EMS showed a strong 
degree of openness and high trade linkage with especially Germany. This was 
already the case under EMS and quite logically continues to be the case under EMU. 
On these grounds he concluded that Austria, Germany and the Benelux would be 
very good candidates for joining a currency union.  
 
Based on Kenen’s argument, opinions on optimality and production diversification in 
Europe have differed over time: While Apel52 tended to support the European 
Commission’s view that production was diversified enough in the EC with a dominant 
share of intra-industry trade, Krugman53 claimed that further European integration 
would lead to a specialisation in production.  
 
c) The criterion of the economy’s openness 
 
McKinnon54 (1963) emphasised on the criterion of openness in his analysis on OCA. 
An economy would be considered to be open, if the proportion of tradable vs. non-
tradable goods was high. A very open economy would experience large price 
fluctuations, if its exchange rate were flexible. The country would consequently have 
a lot to lose, if it were affected by high currency volatility and exchange risk. This 
approach assumed that world prices were more or less constant and that labour and 
capital movements would not matter that much. Given the model’s assumptions, a 
volatile exchange rate would lead to volatile domestic prices. According to McKinnon 
therefore, an open economy that adopted a flexible exchange rate regime to correct 
any external deficit creates greater internal price instability. Indeed, if the economy 
was open and the exchange rate depreciated, rather than reorienting demand 
towards goods produced at home, the country would eventually face rising inflation, 
due to imported goods that become more expensive.  
 
Being non-exclusive to Kenen’s approach, a more open economy would more likely 
be closely linked with other member states of the monetary union and external 
shocks would more likely be symmetric. McKinnon therefore concluded that open 
economies with high trade integration have an interest in forming a monetary union in 
order not to be subject to destabilising exchange rate variations. Fixed exchange 
rates would in this case be preferable55 considering that any currency depreciation 
would lead to imported inflation (and therefore more expensive imports). The 
exchange rate would therefore only be an inefficient instrument to affect real wages.  
Blejer56 supported Kenen’s conclusions, referring to the endogeneity effect of trade, 
which would lead to more synchronised cycles.  
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55 See also Part (1993) 
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d) The criterion of fiscal integration 
 
According to Johnson57 (1969), a high degree of fiscal integration between regions 
would reduce modifications of real exchange rates. Indeed, if demand were to shift to 
the benefit of some region, the fall in exports from the other region would partially be 
compensated by contributions to a community budget (i.e. taxes that make up the 
federal revenues, contributions to social security, etc.). This very same region would 
be automatically ‘compensated’ by revenues obtained from the federal budgetary 
authority. Johnson’s approach served for a long time as the basis for any call greater 
fiscal centrality in Europe. At the same time, though, his argument led and continues 
to lead to controversial debates. Unlike the USA, the EU (or EMU) does not have a 
federal budget of comparable size. Due to the absence of such a central budget, 
Germany and other countries very much insisted on prior fiscal convergence of EMU 
member states. Poorer countries like the Southern member states would have 
welcomed a federal budget to help alleviate existing regional discrepancies within the 
EU and EMU58.  
 
e) The criterion of financial integration 
 
Ingram’s criterion59 related to financial market integration and in a broader sense to 
facilitated stock denotations. By removing all restrictions on capital movements, 
interest rate differentials would be eliminated and accordingly also exchange rate 
variations. Financial market integration does not necessarily imply intense 
commercial exchanges between countries – if these were the case, however, the use 
of the exchange rate instrument could become desirable again.  
 
 
3.2.2 The later ‘reconciliation phase’ with contributions from Fleming, Ishiyama 
and others: 
 
f) The criterion of inflation differentials 
 
Increasingly approaches to the subject of monetary unification in the 1970s spelled 
out the harmonisation of macroeconomic criteria – among others the criterion of 
inflation differentials. The analysis of the inflation criterion was somewhat different 
from previous ones: one does not deal any more with microeconomic perturbations 
resulting from supply and demand conditions, but rather with a macroeconomic 
phenomenon. According to Fleming60, but also Haberler or Magnifico61, if inflation 
differentials between groups of regions were to be nil, this group would form an OCA.  
The underlying argument concerning this criterion stated that any balance of payment 
disequilibrium between regions would be caused by structural differences (or 
differences in economic development), by different social partner behaviour or by 
divergent monetary policies. These different elements could be synthesised in the 
form of inflation rates. Ever since being mentioned first, this approach was extended 
to other business cycle criteria (inter alia GDP growth rates, interest rates, balance of 
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payments, monetary aggregates, etc.) – some of these actually ‘inspiring’ the TEU 
and the therein mentioned convergence criteria.  
 
Approaches in terms of harmonisation of macroeconomic criteria can nevertheless 
evoke at least some criticism: on one side, the harmonisation of a macroeconomic 
criterion always concerns a point (estimate) in time. On the other side, certain 
harmonisation procedures could even have adverse effects by causing supply or 
demand shocks. If one takes the example of the Maastricht criterion on public deficit 
and debt levels, in both cases the reduction of these ratios to the desired level would 
and could (and actually did) imply a strong contraction of aggregate demand levels. 
 
Harmonised macroeconomic-variables (inter alia the balance of payments, growth 
rates and the business cycle, inflation, interest rates) however should be desirable in 
case of a monetary union as they assist in ensuring the smooth functioning of the 
currency area, because any differences in these variables could potentially lead to 
different economic developments and divergent preferences within the currency 
union. 
 
g) Ishiyama’s cost-benefit analysis62 
 
Ishiyama looked at the issue of currency areas from a different perspective. He did 
not state which factors might be of importance in determining whether a region was 
an Optimum Currency Area, but rather weighed overall gains vs. losses. Any country 
considering joining a currency union would be faced with such a pre-entry trade-off. 
Ishiyama believed that higher economic integration between member states would 
result in higher gains and lower costs. On the other hand he concluded that countries 
which are not integrated at all will find that giving up autonomous monetary policy as 
means of stabilisation policy will be very costly for them. 
 
 
3.2.3 The ‘reassessment phase’ with contributions from Tavlas and others 
emphasised more a cost-balance analysis: 
 
h) Tavlas’ credibility approach to OCA Theory63 
 
Necessary characteristics in Tavlas’ view were similar inflation rates, factor mobility 
as a substitute of the exchange rate tool, the openness and size of the economy, the 
economy’s diversification rate, price and wage flexibility, market integration, fiscal 
integration, the country’s explicit need for exchange rate variability and political 
factors (e.g. the political will for creating a monetary union. Tavlas extended this by 
emphasising on the importance of the time inconsistency problem and credibility64 
levels of national authorities. For instance, through adherence to EMU, Italy solved 
the credibility problem, benefiting from a credible (German-style) interest rate policy. 
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i) A monetary approach 
 
Bofinger65 criticised Mundell’s initial OCA framework as neither being ideal, nor being 
applicable to the case of EMU, because it relied on unrealistic assumptions – inter 
alia a ‘one country-one good’ approach; nominal wage rigidity; money illusion; a too 
narrow focus on the asymmetry of shocks; and the ability of exchange rate 
adjustments to solve economic problems. In line with Tavlas, Bofinger argued that a 
monetary union in Europe with delegated and credible monetary policy would solve 
the time inconsistency problem, would lower transaction costs and would facilitate 
monetary shock responses. Joining a monetary union would therefore help 
authorities to attain higher credibility levels and it would be beneficial in terms of 
inflation gains.   
 
 
3.2.4 The ‘empirical phase’ over the last 15-20 years trying to operationalise 
and test OCA theory empirically: 
 
A reuniting echo from literature on the OCA Theory was that greater economic 
integration between members of a monetary union would improve the prospect for 
the union’s success. Most of the literature produced in the early days, applied to 
today’s Europe, would consequently agree that EMU was not a OCA. Europe is 
generally considered to be less integrated than the United States, an economy – 
while functioning well – also being far from an OCA according to basic OCA theory. 
 
Considering the above mentioned theoretical approaches to OCA, optimality of a 
currency zone would depend on the existence of possible adjustment mechanisms, 
which would set in after the occurrence of asymmetric external shocks negatively 
affecting the monetary area. Any such adjustment mechanism would make an 
exogeneous re-adjustment of exchange rates abundant. Potential mechanisms were 
identified to be: perfect mobility of factors of production, perfect flexibility of factor 
prices (e.g. wages) and the existence of an automatic transfer mechanism between 
the central authority and affected regions. 
A major drawback of the initial OCA theory is that it was developed in times when 
economic circumstances were significantly different from today’s economic 
environment. It is therefore not possible to apply those theories ‘one-to-one’ to the 
present and to try to make definite conclusions about the functioning (or even the 
optimality) of EMU.   
A further point to note with respect to currency area theory and EMU is that 
especially the early currency area theory mainly referred to microeconomic aspects, 
among others labour market flexibility, questions of allocation of resources or 
migration. Looking at the history of European monetary integration and in particular 
the run-up to EMU, one can nevertheless observe that these were often dominated 
by macroeconomic aspects – for instance, the emphasis in pre-EMU analysis was 
rather put on nominal criteria, such as inflation, interest rates and public debt and 
deficit rates.  
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As a consequence, adjustment criteria and equilibrating mechanisms introduced by 
Mundell and later contributors were increasingly scrutinised and a number of 
empirical tests were undertaken in order to assess their overall relevance and their 
special relevance with respect to the European monetary integration experiment: 
 
Paul Krugman66 (1991) for instance stated with respect to Mundell’s labour mobility 
criterion that in fact low mobility might limit the risk of polarisation of economic 
activity. A high mobility rate could lead to a specialisation of production within the 
currency union, which would consequently increase the probability of the economy 
being hit by asymmetric shocks. If European states therefore remain less specialised 
(due to lower mobility) than the USA, Europe as a monetary union would need less 
interregional labour mobility. Mundell’s missing ingredient with respect to the labour 
criterion would therefore be less problematic for EMU than initially thought.  
 
Similar studies67 questioned the stabilising role of labour mobility under a fixed 
exchange rate regime or under a monetary union. Interregional mobility was 
considered not to be sufficiently high to absorb asymmetric shocks on labour 
demand. The reason for that was that migration flows would not only influence labour 
supply, but also local consumption demand and consequently also regional labour 
demand by firms. Emigration from a high unemployment region would therefore not 
be able to automatically resolve the under-employment problems Mundell had 
considered.  
 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen68 constructed an OCA index for European countries in 
comparison to Germany, taking output, trade linkages and the usefulness of money 
for transactions into account. They found that there were three groups of countries, 
those which had converged, those which were converging and those with little 
convergence. Bayoumi and Eichengreen compared eight US-American regions with 
eleven EU member states in their analysis. They found that supply shocks were 
larger and less correlated across regions in the EU. However, when looking at core 
European countries only, their findings showed similar results to those of the USA. 
They consequently advocated their preference for a small ‘core-EMU’ only.  
 
Demertzis et al.69 examined how much of the symmetry between EMU countries was 
natural and how much policy induced. They argued that if a higher degree of 
symmetry was a result of economic policies, then the currency union might start to 
drift apart in real terms in the future. When looking at correlation between countries 
and the European average, they found that demand correlations were significant, but 
supply and monetary shocks showed little within-group coherence. To assess 
whether policy variables would matter, they looked for correlation between policy 
variables and economic shocks. One of their main findings showed that correlations 
were larger in the 1990s than in the 1980s. In the 1980s, 10-20% of monetary and 
supply side shocks could be attributed to the use of policy instruments, while in the 
1990s this proportion increased to 25-50%. They therefore concluded that a lot of 
convergence within Europe could be attributed to policy measures. 
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Data by Bayoumi and Eichengreen70 in pre-EMU days illustrated that, in comparison 
to the USA, real exchange rates and real security prices varied more in Europe, both 
suggesting the greater likelihood of region-specific shocks hitting the economy. 
Security prices were important, because they reflected firms’ current and expected 
profits. These would be different in different regions, if the regions were not fully 
integrated. Bayoumi and Eichengreen concluded that supply shocks in the EU were 
larger and less correlated across regions. Furthermore, shock responses were found 
to occur quicker in the USA, while Europe also lacked a federal budget comparable 
to the USA.  
 
In comparison to findings of Bayoumi and Eichengreen, similar empirical surveys 
reviewed shock asymmetry in Europe. One survey by Belke and Gros71 examined 
the extent to which external shocks may affect unemployment. They looked at twelve 
potential EMU participants and tested the hypothesis that shocks to the export sector 
of the economy would negatively influence unemployment rates. Their basic finding 
was that there was no significant link between export and unemployment levels. One 
explanation for these results could have been that the exchange rate as well as 
monetary and fiscal policy managed to offset any negative effects induced by 
economic shocks and that the resulting change in unemployment was only negligible.  
 
Another survey by Vinals and Jimeno72 looked at the relevance of asymmetric shocks 
in Europe. They distinguished and assessed the relevance of European-wide, 
national and regional shocks. Vinals and Jimeno measured unemployment dispersion 
across countries and regions and found that EU-wide shocks explained almost half of 
the variance in national unemployment. On a regional level, regional and EU-wide 
shocks accounted for about 80% of the variance, leaving only 20% to be explained 
by national shocks. Their results therefore claimed that asymmetric shocks were not 
a very important issue for a future EMU, emphasising that most shocks were EU-
wide and therefore symmetric. In this case replacing national currencies with a 
European currency would not prove to be too costly. 
 
In line with Vinals and Jimeno, it has always been advocated by the European 
Commission underlined that with time and further integration, demand shocks would 
become less frequent and even more symmetric, contrasting with Krugman’s view73 
that sector-specific shocks would turn into country-specific shocks. The Commission 
has considered and continues to consider that production in EMU would become 
diversified enough and institutional reforms would reduce the likelihood of 
asymmetric shocks. This diversification of production is especially relevant for smaller 
EMU member states, such as Austria, accounting for a relatively higher import-export 
share. Furthermore, even if regional differences were to prevail, these would be 
countered by national policies as policy responses on the European level would be 
inadequate. The Commission has also until today insisted that nominal exchange 
rate devaluation would be useless, because it would only increase import prices and 
raise production costs, leading workers to claim higher nominal wages, which would 
ultimately offset any devaluation gain. In line with the Commission’s view – in order to 
lay the foundations for both reducing the likelihood of asymmetric shocks and to bring 
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business cycles in line in the run-up to the introduction of the euro – European 
decision-makers agreed upon convergence criteria and fiscal rules as identified in the 
Maastricht Treaty, as will be explained further below.  
 
Further analysis attempting to answer the question whether EMU would be an OCA 
was, for instance, undertaken by Pelkmans74. We have seen that the traditional cost-
benefit analysis rather focused on costs and not on benefits. In line with Duwendag75, 
Pelkmans argued that EMU was “too complex to squeeze it into a mere cost-benefit 
analysis” and therefore he argued that: 
 
- EMU would not be an OCA, but neither were the USA. 
- The likelihood of asymmetric shocks would be low and the use of the 
exchange rate as a policy tool at the national level would not be advisable, 
due to adverse long-run effects that would only set in after a certain time-lag: 
the medium-run or long-run costs of realigning exchange rates could even be 
negative. 
- Labour mobility within sectors and between countries, but also within countries 
was low. 
- National or decentralised fiscal policy responses in Europe would have a 
similar effect as the centralised federal budget system in US. 
- The problem of EMU would have its source in the fact that it consisted of 
countries with different sizes and different degrees of openness – Europe 
would thus be faced with the difficult task of adopting a monetary union 
consisting of countries that faced different costs and benefits.  
 
Evidence by Breuss76 supported Pelkmans argument and added that not only labour 
mobility was lower in the EU than in the USA, but also that wages and prices were 
less flexible. However he conceded that the EU was by definition more open to 
external trade and that, overall, European economies were similarly diversified.  
With respect to trade data, Breuss argued that European economies had become 
very open over time. The ratio of intra-community exports to GDP outweighed 50% in 
Ireland, 40% in Benelux and was around 20% in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and 
Portugal and exceeded 10% in other member states (except for Greece with around 
6%). He furthermore concluded that intra-industry trade reinforcing the advantages of 
openness of the economy to form a union was mainly dominant. This would support 
early views of Kenen and McKinnon, implying that the EU and EMU with their fairly 
high degree of trade diversification and openness would, even if it were not the case 
today, at least slowly move towards an OCA.   
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Recent Eurostat77 data (Tables 4 and 5) on Germany, France and Italy would support 
this argument, giving evidence on rising import and export shares over time. The 
trade argument is even more relevant for smaller economies like Austria, which are 
even more depended on foreign trade due to their lack of national resources and raw 
materials. 
 
Table 4: Exports to EMU-countries (volume indices; seasonally adjusted; the year 2000 as base year; 
2000 = 100)  
 
 
March 
1992 
April 
1992 
May 
1992
January. 
2002
February 
2002
March 
2002
Sept. 
2006 
Oct. 
2006 
Nov. 
2006
   Germany  80.86 82.36 80.64 97.74 98.06 98.25 125.84 126.62 127.16
   France     73.25 73.4 73.76 89.4 89.02 92.47 97.3 96.83 95.87
   Italy          71.69 70.71 70.17 96.07 96.11 95.93 103.88 104.94 101.47
Austria 4.67 4.72 4.74 6.48 6.45 6.57 7.12 6.99 7.1
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Table 5: Imports from EMU-countries (volume indices; seasonally adjusted; the year 2000 as base 
year; 2000 = 100) 
 
 
March 
1992 
April 
1992 
May 
1992
January. 
2002
February 
2002
March 
2002
Sept. 
2006 
Oct. 
2006 
Nov. 
2006
   Germany  83.87 85.3 83.62 93.4 93.8 93.7 119.29 121.63 123.03
   France     74.73 75.01 74.19 89.68 89.93 91.94 105.52 105.18 103.63
   Italy          72.85 72.67 73.12 98.63 99.01 99.33 115.34 115.72 113.53
Austria 4.71 4.78 4.87 6.37 6.35 6.43 7.62 7.74 7.96
 
Source: Eurostat 
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4. Economic theory vs. political considerations?  
 
The initial blueprint of a monetary union evolved and changed with time and with 
ongoing political and economic developments, especially the oil shocks in the 1970s 
and the EMS crises in 1992 and 1993, which illustrated the limitations of intermediate 
exchange rate arrangements. Most economic analysis on the subject of monetary 
unions was based on a cost and benefit analysis - microeconomic benefits and 
macroeconomic stability vs. the potential stability loss. If one was to consider the 
above mentioned OCA theories, one would question their applicability in case of 
EMU. OCA theory however still remains useful as a point of reference and a basis for 
any discussion or economic analysis on EMU78.  
 
Nonetheless, one should never forget in any analysis of EMU – besides economic 
theory – that the political component played a major role in the creation process of 
EMU. Part79 for instance claimed that EMU was certainly not an OCA at the start, but 
he pointed out that theory would leave out relevant historical and political aspects. In 
line with that, Duwendag80 regretted that the “theoretical approaches only give limited 
scope for concrete conclusions on the advantages of EMU”. The optimality criteria of 
sufficient wage flexibility, sufficient labour mobility and a sufficiently centralised 
budgetary process are conditions that are not satisfied by the EU, but still EMU is 
alive and functioning fairly well. 
 
 
4.1 From the Delors Report to the TEU  
 
European monetary construction was given a considerable impulse in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Earlier years of economic discontent and displeasure about the 
European idea led to very little and slow progress in European integration, 
characterised by commentators as the era of general ‘eurosclerosis’.  
According to Duwendag81, the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 was responsible 
for giving European integration a new impulse. It extended provisions of the EEC-
treaty by defining new and deepened integration aims, inter alia the completion of the 
Internal Market characterised by free circulation of goods, services, people and 
capital through the complete removal of remaining competition and non-tariff barriers. 
With regard to services, the SEA identified the goal of freedom of establishment. This 
principle greatly helped the construction of a single market in the banking and 
financial service sector. The liberalisation of capital movements that started at the 
end of the 1980s and coming fully into effect in July 1990 marked the net progress of 
full integration of banking and finance in Europe.  
With full capital mobility established in Europe, a further step towards full monetary 
integration became necessary, as summarised by Wyplosz82: “the decision to adopt a 
single currency is the outcome of constrained optimization. The constraint is the 
impossibility trilogy.”   
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The goal of a monetary union initially endorsed after the Hague Summit in 1969 
according to the recommendation by the Werner expert group was revived at the 
Hanover Council meeting in April 1988. On these grounds, the European Council 
agreed in Hanover to set up a Committee under the chairmanship of Commission 
President Jacques Delors, whose aim was to study and propose concrete steps 
towards the creation of a European Monetary Union. 
 
Intergovernmental discussions and negotiations culminated, being inspired by 
recommendations of the Delors Committee at the end of 1991, in the Treaty of the 
European Union, which set out the unparalleled goal of a monetary union and 
identified the statutes of an independent ECB, its tasks and responsibilities. The 
Committee Report furthermore recommended a ‘stage-approach’, a provisional 
timetable and, last but not least, identified clear accession criteria for eligibility to join 
EMU. Decisions made in Maastricht provided the framework on which the Council of 
Ministers decided upon the creation of EMU for the year 1999. The Delors Report 
contained a ‘maximalist’ conception of EMU: a single currency and consequently a 
single monetary policy by a supranational monetary institution. 
It did not envisage the creation of so-called United States of Europe but rather to 
transfer the necessary sovereignty in monetary matters to EMU under the “principle 
of subsidiarity”.  
 
According to Eichengreen and Frieden83 EMU was a result of “inter-state bargaining 
and of strategic interaction” between the participating players. For example, EMU 
was considered to tie Germany closer to Europe and to diminish its economic and 
political power within Europe. For some countries, most prominently France, one 
benefit was to have monetary policy not being dependent in an informal arrangement 
in which the French franc was subordinate to the deutschmark (as under EMS), but 
to have monetary policy moved to the European level, where the French central bank 
governor would at least have a seat at the table.  
Conversely, especially for Germany, EMU was a result of ‘linkage politics’, i.e. EMU 
was the price to be paid by Germany to get concessions on the way towards a closer 
political union. Eichengreen and Frieden went further citing Fratianni, who stated that 
“…the absence of a compelling economic justification for EMU has led economists to 
conclude that the prime motivating force behind the Maastricht treaty was politics.”84  
 
In Tsoukalis’ view85, EMU was born due to a combination of factors: German 
Westpolitik, the overall concern about the survival of currency arrangements under 
EMS, the concern about the sustainability of CAP, the desire to safeguard fixed 
exchange rates and the wish to adopt a common policy approach vis-à-vis the USA.  
In retrospect, the relatively quick integration moves from the SEA to the Delors 
Report and the TEU could also be explained by political events taking place in the 
late 1980s and over the 1990s: the opposition of the UK to deeper European 
integration, challenges facing the European Community following German re-
unification and the political and economic turmoil in Eastern Europe in times just after 
the breaking up of the Soviet Union.  
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4.2 The Treaty of the European Union signed in Maastricht 
 
The Treaty of the European Union “reviewed”86 the Treaty of Rome in such a way 
that EU would move closer towards becoming a political union. The TEU defined 
convergence criteria for potential EMU member states, set out the institutional 
structure, duties and objectives of the future ECB and defined how monetary policy 
would be conducted in EMU. The Maastricht Treaty also set out the timetable, as 
recommended by the Delors Report, consisting of the following progressive stages-
approach towards the creation of EMU: 
 
Stage I started in July 1990 and paved the way towards full capital market 
liberalisation, integration of banking and financial markets and prioritised closer 
economic coordination and cooperation, as well as identified the convergence criteria 
set out in the TEU.  
 
Stage II aimed at improving macroeconomic policy coordination in Europe – for 
instance in monetary and fiscal, competition, structural and regional policies. It 
improved coordination by defining essential economic objectives and specified 
precise (but not contingent) rules on budgetary deficits and their financing. Despite 
the successive currency crises between September 1992 and August 1993 and 
economic difficulties, the EC entered Stage II as planned on 1 January 1994. This 
second Stage saw the establishment of a European Monetary Institute (EMI) in 
January 1994 in Frankfurt, which would eventually evolve into a European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) charged with the overview of the general monetary orientation 
for the whole of the Community. The EMI’s role was to assist improved coordination 
of national monetary policies, to encourage the convergence in economic 
fundamentals and to supervise and report progress made towards convergence.  
 
The decision which countries would enter EMU was eventually taken in May 1998 
and included eleven of the EU member states. Greece did not meet the criteria at 
first, but joined in 2000, while the UK, Sweden and Denmark voluntarily opted to stay 
out of EMU. 
 
Stage III finally saw the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, the introduction of the 
euro as single EMU currency and the ECB becoming the sole institution in EMU 
entitled to spell out monetary policy with the main objective of ensuring price stability 
within EMU.   
 
 
4.3 The convergence criteria – required admission criteria for entering Stage III  
 
It was intended that countries entering Stage III were bound to fulfil the five 
convergence criteria mentioned in Article 109J(1) of the TEU. The strict nature of the 
convergence criteria was to some degree inspired by the Delors Committee’s 
recommendation, but at the same time strongly insisted upon by countries like 
Germany, whose aim was to identify strict and clear economic membership rules that 
were impossible to be fulfilled by Mediterranean countries. Germany feared a weak 
and instable monetary union, in case countries with divergent debt, deficit and 
inflation rates would obtain membership (for instance Italy). The German government 
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considered the criteria together with an independently led monetary policy to be 
essential to create an adequate frame for the smooth functioning of EMU.  
Therefore, on 1 July 1990, the European Council decided to implement mechanisms 
that would incite member states to conduct coordinated economic policies, enabling 
European countries to ensure inflation-free and permanent growth under surveillance 
of national budgetary policies87.  
One German mistake however – especially with respect to the fiscal criteria evoked 
in the Treaty – was that it only included current debt and deficit levels, but did not 
take into account the dynamics of debt build-up. Due to this mistake, countries like 
Italy managed to reduce its public deficit and its debt level and to lower interest rates 
up to a certain point that ensured membership: with the expectation of entering EMU, 
Italian interest rates converged to a lower level, leading to an increase in bond prices 
and capital inflow. The perspective of the euro therefore ‘consolidated’ Italian public 
finances. Italy’s later return to rising debt levels however can be very much related to 
persisting structural problems of the Italian economy, mainly high government 
expenditures to finance the Italian health and pension system.   
 
The convergence criteria as identified in the TEU88 
 
- With respect to price stability, the Treaty stipulated: "The achievement of a high 
degree of price stability will be apparent from a rate of inflation which is close to that 
of, at most, the three best-performing Member States in terms of price stability."  
The inflation rate of a given Member State was thus not allowed to exceed by more 
than 1.5 percentage points that of the three best-performing countries. 
 
- With respect to government finances, the Treaty stipulated: "The sustainability of 
the government financial position … will be apparent from having achieved a 
government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive. …"  
This concerned compliance with respect to: 
 
• the annual government deficit, i.e. the ratio of the annual government deficit to 
gross domestic product (GDP) was not allowed to exceed 3%, and if it were, 
the ratio would have to decline substantially and continuously.   
 
• government debt, i.e. the ratio of gross government debt to GDP was not 
allowed to exceed 60%, and if it were, the ratio would have to sufficiently 
diminish and approach 60%.   
 
- With respect to exchange rates, the Treaty stipulated: "the observance of the 
normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the 
European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing against the 
currency of any other Member State", corresponding to fluctuation bands of +/- 
2.25% and ever since the EMS currency crises to +/-15% (for some countries) with 
respect to the central rate.  
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- With respect to long-term interest rates, the Treaty stipulated: "the durability of 
convergence achieved by the Member State ... being reflected in the long-term 
interest-rate levels", i.e. the nominal long-term interest rate was not allowed to 
exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of the three best-performing countries 
 
The criteria were laid out as such to ensure “…that constraints on policy implied by 
participation in EMU are likely to prove acceptable within the country.”89  
The aim to ensure a stability community required strict and stability oriented 
exchange rate- and monetary policies, but also reasonable policies by  
non-community actors, among others social partners, employees’ and employers’ 
associations and industry representatives. The criteria also aimed at avoiding 
excessive and expansive national fiscal policies, considering the potentially harmful 
spill-over effects on partner countries.  
Reading the Treaty and especially Article 109J(1), one can hardly deny that the 
therein mentioned criteria were spelled out in a way that would allow for a high 
degree of pragmatism when it comes to the interpretation of the criteria. In retrospect, 
a strict interpretation would certainly have led to only a small number of countries 
qualifying for Stage III.  
 
Overall, the criteria were announced in order to: 
 
- solve the inflation bias problem of EMU, 
- avoid surprise inflation to be used that would erode bond-holders’ value of 
compensation, 
- prevent competitive devaluation temptations prior to accession, 
- avoid attempts for prior competition on capital gains at the expense of other 
countries, 
- avoid the ‘monetisation of debt’ (through political pressure) by setting up an 
independent, hard-nosed and conservative ECB, resembling mostly the 
German Bundesbank model with the sole goal of price stability, 
- tackle doubts on the effectiveness of EMU in view of excessive deficit fears 
and unsustainable debt rates. Fiscal discipline was especially a German 
concern in view of already having foregone independent monetary policy. 
Careless fiscal policy by high debt countries was considered to be potentially 
harmful for exchange rate and interest rate stability, for consumer confidence 
and it was thought to be a potential cause for severe financial crises.  
 
On one side, Clement90 argued that the Maastricht convergence criteria were based 
on the thesis that similar economic structures of member states would help EMU to 
become a zone of stability and therefore policy makers agreed to these prior 
monetary and fiscal convergence criteria. On the other hand critics91 insisted on the 
necessity to extend the criteria to cover also structural and real-economy aspects, 
like the integration of labour markets, harmonised tax policy frameworks, the 
elimination of remaining product market barriers and the convergence of 
unemployment rates and living standards. 
 
                                                          
89 Artis and Lee (1997), ch. 13  
90 Clement (2004), pp. 430 ff. 
91 See for instance WIFO (1996), Duwendag et al. (1999), Baimbridge and Whyman (2003), Clement (2004) 
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One of the arguments in favour of public finance criteria insisted that excessive debt 
and deficit levels would lead to inflationary tensions and would therefore constitute a 
threat to price stability in EMU. The excessive character of budgetary deficits 
nevertheless had to be regarded relative to the business cycle position:  
In times of a recession it would be normal to see a small deficit increase in order to 
give an impetus to economic activity. However, if economic circumstances would 
prove to be harsh, adhering to a strict 3% deficit limit would not only be a difficult 
task, but also leave no room at all for supporting the economy in a trough. For this 
reason, the 3% level that prior to the start of EMU would not seem to be much of a 
challenge – at least at the time of the ratification of the TEU – turned out to become a 
level that would only be met with some difficulties by some countries (i.e. in difficult 
times as occurred in the mid 1990s).  
 
Another argument with respect to the criteria related to the fear that public debt rates 
would compromise price stability and could potentially endanger a country’s 
solvability level. Debt levels also had to be considered in the perspective of the ability 
to raise taxes and obtain tax receipts in future periods. In retrospect it therefore 
seemed that a country like Belgium (satisfying the inflation criterion with 1.3%), 
whose debt level – despite showing a tendency towards reduction – was well over 
100% of GDP in 1998, would not endanger EMU, as compared to a country with 
similar debt levels, such as Italy or Greece. 
 
Other clauses of the TEU had the intention to incite budgetary discipline in a less 
direct way than the convergence criteria. This concerned for example the prohibition 
of direct ECB financing of member states through the form of borrowing and of 
member states financing its partners directly in case of financial problems. Both 
cases were meant to impede the resurgence of inflation tensions in the monetary 
union.  
 
The inflation criterion expressed in relative terms (i.e. relative to the three lowest 
inflation countries) did not pose a problem to any country, except for Greece with its 
inflation rate still being close 5% in 1998.  
All European states engaged in anti-inflation policies in the middle of the 1980s and 
even engaged in competitive disinflation that lowered inflation to levels below 2.8% in 
1998 (with Portugal having an inflation level of 2.8%; also see Table 8 below). The 
inflation criterion was justified by the fact that too large inflation differentials would 
tempt a high inflation country to devalue its currency in order to restore its price 
competitiveness, which was impossible in a monetary union.  
This criterion was linked to the criterion on long-run interest rates:  
Nominal interest rate differentials indeed corresponded to anticipated inflation 
differences92. The importance of these differentials therefore took account of the 
anticipations of economic agents.  
 
Overall, to question the pertinence of the strict budgetary rules that were imposed 
with the convergence criteria does not imply a denial of the necessity of budgetary 
discipline. Fiscal policy had to be coordinated and disciplined in order to prevent the 
contamination of monetary policy. The strict rules therefore seemed to be politically 
necessary, even though being economically highly controversial.  
 
                                                          
92 Fisher’s hypothesis taken from http://economic.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/fisher_h.htm 
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4.4 Qualifying for the euro 
 
Euro area candidate countries were selected at the intergovernmental conference in 
Brussels on 2 and 3 May 1998. Eleven countries were admitted to Stage III, which 
started in January 1999, i.e. Germany, Austria, the Benelux countries, Spain, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. Among the four countries that would not enter 
Stage III in the first wave, Greece would not participate for failing to meet the criteria, 
but eventually joined in 2001 after significantly improving its fiscal and monetary 
stance. The UK, Sweden and Denmark deliberately chose for political reasons not to 
be admitted to EMU.  
 
All countries without exception satisfied the public deficit and interest rate criterion. 
Except for Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal however, the criterion of public 
debt was not satisfied. Of course it was clear that the public debt stock could not be 
reduced at a comparably fast rate as were deficit levels.  
 
The pound, the Swedish krona and the drachma remained outside the reference 
period with respect to the exchange rate criterion (March 1996, February 1998). The 
lira and the Finnish marka only joined the ERM in November 1996. Consequently 
only 10 out of 15 possible currencies did participate in the ERM in the reference 
period identified in the TEU. Italy’s and Finland’s particular case however has not 
impeded them from qualification.   
 
 
4.5 The "policy-mix" in Europe 
 
A single monetary policy 
 
In EMU, the ECB is charged with the control of money creation and destruction, it 
sets monetary and inflation objectives, determines interest rates and liquidity for the 
whole of EMU, trying to average out member states’ needs while conducting 
monetary policy. The primary objective as identified in its statutes is the maintenance 
of price stability at an inflation level of 2%. However, the ECB is also required to 
support the general economic environment in the Community, but without prejudice 
to the objective of price stability. The underlying reason for this very strong emphasis 
on price stability is the belief that monetary policy cannot have any long-lasting 
influence on real economic variables, such as output growth and employment. The 
ECB therefore formulates and executes monetary policy with the aim of providing a 
stable economic environment across EMU. Its interest rate choice shapes EMU 
economies and its statute prohibits the ECB from investing money or lending out 
funds to governments.  
 
The role and policy objectives of the ECB and the ESCB have not only in the run-up 
to the ECB’s creation, but also nowadays, been highly debated. For instance, while 
Germany defended and defends the ECB’s role of primarily fighting inflation, France 
would welcome a less ‘inflation-focused’ central bank, which would also take into 
account other economic criteria in its interest rate- and monetary policy decisions. At 
a discussion round93 in Berlin, German politicians once more defended the ECB, 
stating that inflation differences in Europe “were not the fault of the ECB, but rather 
                                                          
93 Diskussionsveranstaltung Berlin (2007) 
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the result of insufficient adjustment of national economic policies…” while French 
counterparts would welcome an ECB that laid less focus on inflation and more on the 
business cycle.   
 
Fiscal policies 
 
The TEU did not spell out fiscal federalism or the transfer of significant parts of 
national budgets to the Community level in order to allow an augmentation of the 
small Community budget that currently is around 1.27% of the EU’s GDP, compared 
to 30% in the USA. Furthermore, the 2007-2013 financial perspective only forecasts 
an EU budget between 800 billion and 1 trillion euro, a figure that only represents 
about 1.14% of the EU's GDP. Fiscal policy remains a national sovereignty in EMU 
and any form of financial solidarity is prohibited. Only very special circumstances, 
such as a natural catastrophe, would allow Community assistance to a country in 
financial difficulties.  
 
Keeping national sovereignty in budgetary matters seemed necessary in order to 
allow countries to administer or react to asymmetric shocks that could occur in the 
eurozone. The possibility of intra-Community fiscal transfers however would seem to 
be an efficient solution, but at the same time seems highly unrealistic, as member 
states were already being deprived of autonomous monetary policies. Decentralised 
national fiscal policy in the EU was thought to be necessary in order to react to 
asymmetric economic shocks affecting the currency union (like the Asian stock 
market crisis in the late 1990s). It is obviously fairly difficult to make exact forecasts 
about asymmetric shocks in the future or whether EMU would increase or decrease 
their likelihood. One can expect that a single currency would accentuate regional 
specialisation or ‘a better division of labour’ in Europe. This however will increase the 
vulnerability of the different European regions from being affected by asymmetric 
shocks. Conversely, market integration will probably lead to more co-variation of 
economic activity. In case of asymmetric shocks, monetary policy could play a 
stabilising role, i.e. absorb asymmetric shocks and reduce pressures on fiscal policy. 
If a strong asymmetry of shocks would prevail, member states would be able to use 
fiscal policy as counter-measures.  
 
Fiscal discipline in the eurozone: the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
 
A common view in the run-up to EMU and during its first years of existence was that 
the absence of fiscal coordination could potentially and severely hamper the success 
of monetary unification. Uncoordinated fiscal policies could lead to unwanted effects 
on interest rates, on capital movements and on inflation differentials and ultimately 
and potentially lead to a credibility crisis in EMU. For these reasons, several 
European countries – with Germany at the forefront – insisted on clearly defined 
post-Maastricht rules on public finances in order to prevent the return to fiscal laxity 
with respect to national deficit and debt rates. The SGP adopted by the Amsterdam 
intergovernmental conference94 was considered to be a necessary ‘debt-break’ 
applying to all member states to ensure continuous fiscal discipline after EMU 
accession.    
 
                                                          
94 The SGP is based on Art. 99 and 104 of the EC Treaty (with amendments adopted in Maastricht) and was 
adopted in 1997 at the IGC in Amsterdam  
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Coordination of fiscal policies in Europe did not only impose itself out of the necessity 
to avoid budgetary ‘excess’, but also to avoid EMU having a monetary bias leading to 
too restrictive fiscal policy without taking the form of stabilisation. A decentralised 
fiscal policy is effectively susceptible to externalities affecting both the initiating 
country and its partner states. Fiscal policy can have a stimulating effect on economic 
activity that does not limit itself to the country carrying out the policy. Partner states 
for instance see a favourable development in growth levels through an increase in 
commercial exchanges. The result for the country initiating the fiscal policy expansion 
is a deteriorating trade balance, which could effectively impede a country to engage 
in too active fiscal policy.  
 
On the other hand, too restrictive fiscal policy could be harmful in case of a prolonged 
weakness of growth rates within EMU. For this reason it is essential that 
governments concerned coordinate their actions, rather than act by themselves. A 
coordinated effort to re-launch economic activities, for instance, would not affect the 
bilateral commercial balance.  
 
The SGP appeared as a desired complement to the TEU, because fiscal discipline 
rules imposed by the latter were imprecise. The SGP took the Treaty’s rules and 
improved them in order to apply them without leaving any ambiguities after EMU 
would start. Referring to the debate on fiscal federalism, Duisenberg95 defended “the 
existence of the SGP…” that “…leads to the conclusion that EMU does not need a 
centralised budget. With national budget positions close to balance or in surplus, 
countries have ample room for manoeuvre to cope with adverse economic 
developments.” 
 
Another initiative taken by European authorities concerned the establishment of a 
new informal group of decision-makers, i.e. the Eurogroup, which is a subset of the 
ECOFIN Council and whose task is confirmed to be the better coordination of 
respective economic policies.  
 
Fiscal discipline within EMU takes the form of prevention of excessive public deficits. 
If member states fail to prevent them, they expose themselves to sanctions by the 
Community. A public deficit is not considered to be excessive, if it remains below 3% 
of GDP (i.e. the TEU criterion). The SGP however specifies that breaching the 3% 
limit is possible, if the breaching is only of an exceptional and temporary character. 
This could have two origins: either a major unforeseen and exogenous event, such 
as a natural catastrophe, or a severe recession. The notion of a severe recession is, 
in its turn, also specified, even if it has to be dealt with case by case. In principle, only 
a drop of the GDP by over 2% per annum can be considered to be of an exceptional 
character. The question is whether a member state could ask for special treatment 
for a severe recession, if the reduction is between 0.75-2%.  
In case of an excessive deficit, the European Council convenes and recommends 
corrective measures to be undertaken by the corresponding state in the following 
year. If the state does not comply with or succeed following the recommendations 
within the period asked, sanctions could be imposed, taking for example the form of 
reduced structural funds for the respective country.  
 
 
                                                          
95 Duisenberg in Peterson (2002), ch. 8 
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Overall, Gros and Thygesen96 were of the opinion that EMU members would need to 
follow a proper policy mix, because demand-management policies in EMU could 
potentially have spill-over effects on other countries, leading to a deflationary bias in 
other countries (i.e. policies could have the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ effect). 
Uncoordinated fiscal policy therefore might threaten efficient monetary policy and its 
price stability objective. In addition to the above arguments, Artis and Lee97 insisted 
on the relevance of fiscal criteria pointing out that excessive debt rates after a fiscal 
expansion would potentially lead to a monetisation of debt in a political crisis and put 
pressure on ECB to intervene in favour of the government concerned and in solidarity 
with threatened banks holding government bonds. 
 
One counter argument by Gros and Thygesen98 to the criticism that the fiscal criteria 
would not allow sensible anti-cyclical fiscal policies was that “activist policy is no 
longer deliberately practiced in most countries because experience has shown that 
the lag between the time when a downward swing has occurred and when effective 
action can be taken is just too long”. The argument is usually phrased in terms of 
automatic stabilisers that should be allowed to work in case of an economic 
slowdown. Economic agents would in this case pay lower taxes, consequently public 
receipts would fall.  
 
Several authors99 indicate that fiscal coordination would be necessary as the EU 
budget is too small for a credible stabilisation role. They remark that some form of 
fiscal federalism – a more federal European structure with centralised redistributive 
policies of taxing, borrowing and spending – would be desirable and could be 
considered as a possibility in the long run. At least decision-makers should consider 
ways to re-organise the financing of the Community budget. One proposal in this 
direction concerned the implementation of taxes on short-run speculative financial 
operations or on air and maritime travel to be used for Community purposes. One of 
the advocates of such a tax was former Austrian Chancellor Schüssel100 who 
repeatedly asked for increasing the Community budget, while insisting that the overall 
burden for consumers should not be increased. Schüssel advocated this move 
parallel to a EU budgetary reform. A similar proposal was already brought forward in 
1977 by MacDougall101 who suggested in his report on European monetary 
integration to raise the EC budget from 0.7% to 2-2.5% in order to reduce inter-
regional differences and inequalities. MacDougall argued that, by raising the 
Community budget accordingly to the recommended size, intra-Community 
inequalities could be reduced by around 40%. 
 Although many changes have occurred in Europe ever since MacDougall’s call and 
although these numbers are highly out-dated, nevertheless similar ideas and reform 
proposals going into the same direction are brought forward today.  
 
The EU’s budget is currently at 1.27% of EU member states’ GDP. Even though 
arguments exist in favour of greater centralisation, member states have never 
seemed inclined to engage in this direction. This partly reflects the difficulties to 
                                                          
96 Gros and Thygesen (1998) 
97 Artis and Lee (1997), ch. 13 
98 Gros and Thygesen (1998), pp. 252 ff. 
99 See for instance Gros and Thygesen (1998), Eichengreen and Frieden (1994), Giovannini (1995), Cuadrado-
Roura et al. (2002) 
100 Schüssel (2007) 
101 MacDougall in Baimbridge and Whyman (2003), ch. 7, p. 96 ff. 
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reconcile very diverse political preferences within the EU. According to Gros and 
Thygesen, the real obstacle for effective policy coordination or a move towards fiscal 
federalism is that fiscal policy “is determined mostly by short-term domestic political 
considerations. It would be very difficult for any government to explain to its 
electorate that it has to increase taxes and/or reduce expenditure because demand is 
too strong in other parts of the EU, and in some cases it might be impossible to 
obtain the required majorities in national parliaments, even if the government had 
agreed to such a move.” 102  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
102 Gros and Thygesen (1998), pp. 323 ff. 
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5. Eurozone and country performance between 1992 and 2007 
 
This part of the thesis aims at giving an empirical overview of the last ten to fifteen 
years, introducing relevant economic data in order to assess EMU’s first years of 
existence. This assessment however will not be and cannot be exhaustive, nor will it 
be possible to draw definite conclusions about the future of EMU, considering its brief 
period of existence. Hopefully though this analysis will give a general idea where 
EMU stands right now and where it is heading, while enabling us to identify potential 
future problems that need to be addressed by European policy makers.   
 
Considering the different national economies and analysing their success with 
respect to meeting the convergence criteria in the mid and late 1990s, the outlook 
prior to EMU was not bright for some European countries. The early 1990s were 
characterised by a fairly big diversity of economic fundamentals, shedding some 
doubt on successful convergence.  
 
Taking for instance the year 1993 – the year of the TEU entering into force (nota 
bene that 2003 was also the year of the EMS collapse) – three groups of countries 
could be distinguished: 
 
- Mainly the Southern European states being fairly far away from reaching the 
entry targets: 
o Greece with a public deficit of 14%, a public debt of over 110% of GDP 
and an inflation rate of over 14%. 
o Portugal with an inflation rate of 6.7% and a deficit of 5.6%. 
o Italy with an inflation rate of around 4.6%, a government debt of over 
115% of GDP and a deficit of over 9%. 
o Spain with a deficit of 6.6% and an inflation rate 4.6% 
o Belgium with a gross government debt of over 133% of GDP and a 
deficit of 7% of GDP.  
 
- On the other hand, the ‘core’ countries that respected the criteria almost in any 
aspect:  
o Germany with inflation of 4.4% and a deficit of 3.4%. 
o France with a deficit of 5.6%.  
o Luxembourg with an inflation rate of around 3% 
o Denmark with a gross government debt level of around 80%. 
o The Netherlands with a deficit of 3.1% and inflation of 2.6%. 
 
- Finally countries in between or countries not yet members of the EU, missing 
at least one objective or criteria: 
o Austria with a public deficit of around 4.1% and inflation rate ranging 
around 3.6%.  
o The UK with an inflation level of around 4.3% and a public deficit of 
over 7.6%.  
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Differences in economic preconditions at the time risked to threaten the successful 
and sustainable implementation of EMU. It was even more worrying that some 
countries seemed to get even further away from the targets, rather then approaching 
them. This negative development occurred despite real efforts by certain member 
states to improve their economic and financial situation. The ongoing developments, 
however, were not of an irreversible nature, as they could mainly be accounted for by 
unfavourable cyclical developments in the period around 1993 and, among others, 
the repercussions of German re-unification, high interest rate and anti-inflationary 
policies in Germany and ramifications of the EMS currency crises.   
 
The period between 1993 and 1998 witnessed a general improvement towards 
meeting the Maastricht criteria. Germany had slowly digested the effects of re-
unification, being able to reduce its inflation rate from 4.4% in 1993 to 1.45% in 1996 
(with only a small increase to 1.9% in 1997). The core countries’ interest rates 
converged already in the early 1990s with the ones of the periphery following after 
the mid-1990s.  
 
Graph 1 – Maastricht fiscal criteria 1997103 
 
 
 
 
With respect to the fiscal criteria (as illustrated in Graph 1 above for 1997 and Tables 
6 and 7 below), Germany was able to reduce its public deficit from 3.4% in 1993 to 
2.2% in 1998. Germany was nevertheless not able to reverse the trend on public 
debt levels with 45.8% of GDP in 1993, 59.7% in 1997 and 60.3% in 1998.  
France remained in 1998 in the circle of the lowest inflation countries (with 0.6% in 
1998 even the lowest of all rates) compared to 2.1% in 1993.  
Italy had neatly improved through fiscal consolidation and reduced its public deficit to 
2.8% in 1998, compared to 9.1% in 1993.  
                                                          
103 In Baldwin and Wyplosz (2004) 
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Denmark achieved in the same time a total reversal and went from a 2.8% to a nil-
deficit.  
One of the doubtful adherents to EMU, i.e. Greece, improved from around 14% in 
1993 to a deficit of 4.3% of GDP in 1998, however still clearly missing the required 
level of 3%. Its inflation rate fell in the same period from 14.4% in 1993 to 4.8% in 
1998 (compared to the required limit of 2.7%). 
As for Austria which was not yet a EU member in 1993, it ‘followed suit’ with 
Germany, achieving remarkable disinflation, while being able to reduce its deficit, but 
not its public debt rate, which surpassed the 60% limit in 1998. 
 
 
Table 6: General government consolidated gross debt; Excessive deficit procedure (based on ESA 
1995) and former definition (linked series); percentage of GDP; various countries; various years 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
                                      
Austria  56.1 56.1 55.8 60.5 63.4 67.9 67.6 63.8 64.3 66.5 65.5 66.0 65.8 64.6 63.9 63.5 62.2 60.6 
Belgium  125.7 127.1 129.0 133.4 131.5 129.7 126.9 122.2 117.0 113.6 107.7 106.3 103.3 98.6 94.3 93.2 89.1 85.6 
Cyprus             50.2 54.4 58.4 58.7 58.8 60.7 64.7 69.1 70.3 69.2 65.3 61.5 
Czech 
Republic            14.6 12.5 13.1 15.0 16.4 18.5 25.1 28.5 30.1 30.7 30.4 30.4 30.6 
Denmark  62.0 62.8 68.0 80.1 76.5 72.5 69.2 65.2 60.8 57.4 51.7 47.4 46.8 45.8 44.0 36.3 30.2 25.0 
Finland  14.0 22.2 40.0 55.3 57.8 56.7 56.9 53.8 48.2 45.5 43.8 42.3 41.3 44.3 44.1 41.4 39.1 37.0 
France  35.3 36.2 39.8 45.7 48.9 55.1 57.6 58.5 58.7 58.3 56.7 56.2 58.2 62.4 64.3 66.2 63.9 62.9 
Germany    39.5 42.1 45.8 48.0 55.6 58.4 59.7 60.3 60.9 59.7 58.8 60.3 63.9 65.7 67.9 67.9 65.4 
Greece  79.6 82.2 87.8 110.1 107.9 108.7 111.3 114.0 112.4 112.3 111.6 113.2 110.7 107.8 108.5 107.5 104.6 100.9 
Hungary              71.7 62.3 60.4 59.5 54.2 52.1 55.6 58.0 59.4 61.7 66.0 67.1 
Ireland  93.2 94.5 91.5 94.1 88.6 81.1 73.0 64.2 53.4 48.4 37.8 35.5 32.2 31.2 29.7 27.4 24.9 23.0 
Italy  94.7 98.0 105.2 115.6 121.5 121.2 120.6 118.1 114.9 113.7 109.1 108.7 105.6 104.3 103.8 106.2 106.8 105.0 
Malta             38.4 47.0 52.0 56.4 56.0 62.1 60.8 70.4 73.9 72.4 66.5 65.9 
Netherlands  76.1 76.1 77.1 78.5 75.6 76.1 74.1 68.2 65.7 61.1 53.8 50.7 50.5 52.0 52.6 52.7 48.7 47.7 
Poland              43.4 42.9 38.9 39.3 35.9 35.9 39.8 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.8 48.4 
Portugal  55.3 57.7 51.7 56.1 59.0 61.0 59.9 56.1 52.2 51.4 50.4 52.9 55.5 56.8 58.2 63.6 64.7 65.4 
Slovakia            22.0 30.8 33.5 34.4 47.5 50.2 48.9 43.3 42.4 41.5 34.5 30.7 29.7 
Slovenia             21.0 21.4 22.1 24.6 27.6 28.3 29.1 28.6 28.9 28.4 27.8 27.5 
Spain  42.6 43.4 45.9 57.2 59.8 62.7 66.8 65.3 63.2 61.5 59.2 55.5 52.5 48.8 46.2 43.2 39.9 37.0 
Sweden  42.0 50.1 63.3 70.7 73.2 73.0 73.0 70.0 67.6 62.2 52.3 53.8 52.0 53.5 52.4 52.2 46.9 42.1 
United 
Kingdom  33.4 33.8 38.7 44.7 47.9 51.0 51.2 49.6 46.6 44.0 41.2 38.0 37.4 38.8 40.3 42.2 43.5 44.0 
                                      
Bulgaria               105.1 79.6 79.3 73.6 66.2 53.6 45.9 37.9 29.2 22.8 20.9 
Romania                 18.0 24.0 23.9 23.2 25.0 21.5 18.8 15.8 12.4 12.8 
                                      
EU15 53.2 53.8 56.2 62.9 65.3 69.6 71.5 69.8 68.0 67.1 63.1 62.2 61.5 63.0 63.3 64.5 63.3 62.2 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO Database 
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Table 7: Excessive deficit procedure; change of debt percentage of GDP at market prices; various 
countries; various years 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
                                      
Austria  -2.4 -2.9 -1.9 -4.1 -4.8 -5.6 -3.9 -1.7 -2.3 -2.2 -1.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.6 -1.2 -1.6 -1.4 -0.9 
Belgium  -5.2 -6.0 -6.8 -7.0 -4.7 -4.4 -3.8 -2.0 -0.8 -0.5 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 -2.3 0.2 -0.1 
Cyprus                 -4.1 -4.3 -2.3 -2.2 -4.4 -6.3 -4.1 -2.3 -1.5 -1.4 
Czech Republic            -13 -3.3 -3.8 -5.0 -3.7 -3.7 -5.7 -6.8 -6.6 -2.9 -3.5 -2.9 -3.9 
Denmark  -1.0 -2.4 -2.2 -2.8 -2.5 -2.9 -1.9 -0.5 0.0 1.3 2.3 1.5 0.2 0.0 2.0 4.7 4.2 3.7 
Estonia       9.5 4.3 0.4 -1.9 1.7 -0.3 -3.6 -0.2 -0.3 0.4 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.8 3.7 
Finland  5.2 -1.4 -5.6 -7.8 -6.0 -6.2 -3.5 -1.2 1.7 1.6 6.9 5.0 4.1 2.5 2.3 2.7 3.9 3.7 
France  -1.5 -2.0 -3.8 -5.6 -5.6 -5.5 -4.1 -3.0 -2.6 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 -3.2 -4.1 -3.6 -3.0 -2.5 -2.4 
Germany   -3.2 -2.7 -3.4 -2.5 -3.2 -3.3 -2.6 -2.2 -1.5 1.3 -2.8 -3.7 -4.0 -3.7 -3.2 -1.7 -0.6 
Greece  -16 -11 -13 -14 -10 -10 -7.4 -6.6 -4.3 -3.4 -4.0 -4.9 -5.2 -6.2 -7.9 -5.5 -2.6 -2.4 
Hungary              -4.6 -6.1 -8.0 -5.4 -2.9 -4.0 -8.9 -7.2 -6.5 -7.8 -9.2 -6.8 
Ireland  -2.2 -2.2 -2.4 -2.3 -1.5 -2.0 0.0 1.3 2.4 2.7 4.6 0.8 -0.4 0.4 1.4 1.0 2.9 1.5 
Italy  -11 -9.7 -9.2 -9.1 -8.8 -7.4 -7.0 -2.7 -2.8 -1.7 -0.8 -3.1 -2.9 -3.5 -3.5 -4.2 -4.4 -2.1 
Latvia 6.8 5.7 -0.5 2.2 -1.3 -2.0 -0.5 1.4 -0.6 -5.3 -2.8 -2.1 -2.3 -1.6 -1.0 -0.2 0.4 0.2 
Lithuania       -0.8 -0.9 -1.6 -3.3 
-
11.9 -3.1 -2.8 -3.2 -2.1 -1.9 -1.3 -1.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 
Luxembourg  4.1 1.5 0.6 1.3 2.3 2.4 1.2 3.7 3.4 3.4 6.0 6.1 2.1 0.4 -1.2 -0.3 0.1 0.4 
Malta                 -9.8 -7.6 -6.2 -6.4 -5.5 -10 -4.9 -3.1 -2.6 -2.1 
Netherlands  -4.9 -2.7 -3.7 -3.1 -3.6 -4.3 -1.9 -1.2 -0.9 0.4 2.0 -0.2 -2.0 -3.1 -1.8 -0.3 0.6 -0.7 
Poland    -8.5 -6.4 -4.1 5.8 -4.4 -4.9 -4.6 -4.3 -2.3 -3.0 -5.1 -5.0 -6.3 -5.7 -4.3 -3.9 -3.4 
Portugal  -4.7 -5.5 -2.7 -5.6 -5.6 -5.2 -4.5 -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 -2.9 -4.3 -2.9 -2.9 -3.3 -6.1 -3.9 -3.5 
Slovakia        -31 -6.0 -1.8 -8.6 -6.7 -4.8 -6.4 -12 -6.5 -7.7 -2.7 -2.4 -2.8 -3.4 -2.9 
Slovenia                   -2.0 -3.9 -4.3 -2.5 -2.8 -2.3 -1.5 -1.4 -1.5 
Spain  -4.1 -4.2 -3.9 -6.6 -6.0 -6.5 -4.8 -3.3 -3.1 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 1.1 1.8 1.4 
Sweden  4.0 -1.1 -7.3 -11 -9.5 -7.5 -3.3 -1.6 1.1 1.4 3.8 1.6 -1.2 -0.9 0.8 2.1 2.2 2.2 
United Kingdom  -0.9 -2.2 -6.0 -7.6 -6.6 -5.7 -4.1 -2.1 0.1 1.2 4.0 1.0 -1.6 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1 -2.8 -2.6 
                                      
Bulgaria   -13 -5.4 -10 -5.4 -3.4 -1.8 5.3 1.7 0.4 -0.5 0.2 -0.2 -0.9 2.2 1.9 3.3 2.0 
Romania                 -3.2 -4.5 -4.6 -3.3 -2.0 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -1.9 -3.2 
                                      
EU15 -3.4 -4.0 -4.9 -5.9 -5.3 -5.1 -4.1 -2.4 -1.7 -0.7 1.0 -1.1 -2.2 -2.9 -2.6 -2.3 -1.9 -1.5 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO Database 
 
 
Robert McKinnon was one of many commentators praising the restrictive character of 
the Maastricht convergence criteria requirements, insisting that only formal criteria 
would help to curb fiscal debt and deficit levels. In particular Mediterranean countries 
with high public debt rates needed to show strong commitment to the Maastricht 
criteria in the mid-1990s and indeed achieved remarkable progress in order to ensure 
eligibility to EMU. Germany’s main ‘worry’ in the run-up to EMU, i.e. Italy, managed to 
qualify despite the fact that the criteria were designed by Germany in a way to keep 
Italy out of EMU. Italy however managed to benefit from the higher credibility level in 
prospect of joining EMU. At the same time Italy introduced a strict consolidation 
programme to rehabilitate public finances. Overall, however, McKinnon reproached 
the ‘creative accounting’ methods, among others used in Italy, but also in countries 
like France, which used the privatisation of France Télécom to reduce the budget 
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deficit and public debt. On the other hand, despite less dramatic public deficit and 
debt rates, Austria too used privatisation of public assets to help eligibility for EMU. 
McKinnon went on arguing 104 that the “bulk of this fiscal adjustment in EU countries 
was structural rather than cyclical” – much of this being the effort of joining EMU.  
 
As for the year 2006 (see also Graph 2 to 4), deficit and debt rates still showed a 
divergent trend with Spain and Ireland having a budget surplus while Germany, 
France or Italy were close or even exceeding the 3% SGP-limit with France 
forecasting a nil-deficit for 2012 at the earliest.  
A similar trend is visible with respect to public debt rates in Belgium, Greece and Italy 
clearly surpassing the 60% SGP-limit, while Ireland and Spain show levels of well 
under 30% of GDP.  
 
 
 
Table 8: Consumer price index; annual percentage change; various countries; various years  
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria 3.3 3.4 4 3.6 3 1.9 1.3 0.9 0.6 2.3 2.6 1.8 1.4 2.1 2.3 1.4
Belgium 3.4 3.2 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.6 0.9 1.1 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.8 1.8
Czech Rep. .. .. 11.1 20.8 10 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 1.8 0.19 2.8 1.9 2.6
Denmark 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.3 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.2 1.8 1.9
Finland 6.1 4.3 2.9 2.2 1.1 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.2 3 2.6 1.6 0.9 0.2 0.6 1.6
France 3.2 3.2 2.4 2.1 1.7 2 1.2 0.6 0.5 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7
Germany 2.7 4.1 5.1 4.4 2.7 1.4 1.9 0.9 0.6 1.5 1.9 1.4 1 1.7 1.9 1.7
Greece 20 19.5 15.9 14.4 10.9 8.2 5.6 4.8 2.6 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.6 2.9 3.6 3.2
Hungary 28.4 34.8 23.6 22.4 18.8 23.5 18.3 14.2 9.9 9.8 9.1 5.3 4.7 6.7 3.6 3.9
Ireland 3.3 3.2 3.1 1.5 2.4 1.7 1.4 2.4 1.6 5.6 4.9 4.6 3.5 2.2 2.4 3.9
Italy 6.5 6.3 5.3 4.6 4.1 4 2 1.9 1.7 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.2 2 2.1
Lux. 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.6 2.2 1.2 1.4 0.9 1 3.1 2.7 2.1 2 2.2 2.5 2.7
Netherl. 2.5 3.2 3.2 2.6 2.8 2 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.4 4.2 3.3 2.1 1.2 1.7 1.2
Poland .. 76.7 46.1 36.9 33 19.8 14.9 11.6 7.2 9.9 5.1 1.9 0.7 3.4 2.2 1.3
Portugal 13.8 10.5 9.4 6.7 5.4 3.1 2.3 2.8 2.3 2.9 4.4 3.6 3.3 2.4 2.3 3.1
Slovakia .. .. 9.9 23.3 13.4 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12 7.3 3.1 8.6 7.5 2.7 4.5
Spain 6.7 5.9 5.9 4.6 4.7 3.6 1.9 1.8 2.3 3.4 3.6 3.1 3 3 3.4 3.5
Sweden 10.4 9.4 2.4 4.7 2.2 0.5 0.7 -0.3 0.5 0.9 2.4 2.2 1.9 0.4 0.5 1.4
UK 6.9 7.5 4.3 2.5 2 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 2 2.3
                          
EU 15 5.3 5.5 4.5 3.8 3 2.5 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.9 2.3 2 2 1.9 2.2 2.2
 
Source: OECD 
 
With respect to inflation rates, the eurozone overall witnessed a general reduction in 
the years after the euro’s introduction with countries like Germany faring better than 
Greece or Ireland (see Table 8). In the initial period after the introduction of the euro, 
however, inflation picked up slightly, especially in Ireland and the Netherlands, due to 
a sharp oil price increase, the initial sharp depreciation of the euro, rising food prices 
following the animal disease surge and indirect taxes. However, one can still say that 
the initial euro years saw some degree of price stabilisation in the eurozone. 
                                                          
104 McKinnon in Baimbridge and Whyman (2003), ch.  6, pp. 81 ff.  
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Honohan and Lane105 nonetheless insisted that inflation divergence in EMU was 
higher than expected. They cited differentiated demand shocks and different 
productivity growth as being the responsible factors. With respect to the former, 
Honohan and Lane claimed that member states were differently exposed to 
international trade with non-eurozone countries and therefore differently affected by 
movements in international currency markets. Ireland, for instance, was much more 
affected by and dependent on trade generated from the USA (and therefore by 
currency movements of the US-Dollar) than Luxembourg.  
 
Existing differences and causes for inflation divergence can also be attributed to 
benign structural factors, divergences in cyclical positions and national fiscal policies, 
the exposure to the external environment and to country-specific labour and product 
market rigidities in or labour institutions. One final factor accounted for were property 
booms in several countries that occurred in several countries (e.g. Ireland or the UK). 
 
Overall the last two years – especially though the end of 2007 and the beginning of 
2008 – saw a considerable rise in eurozone inflation rates to levels well over the ECB 
objective of 2%, with inflation rates as high as 3.5% in February 2008 in some EU 
countries.  
 
With respect to the new EU member states we can observe a similarly strong 
divergence with regard to key economic variables:  
- The ‘good pupils’ of the twelve new EU member states, i.e. Slovenia, Malta 
and Cyprus, which already joined the eurozone as the newest three members 
in 2007 and 2008 respectively, showed deficit and debt rates that were close 
to the Maastricht and SGP criteria. 
- Other new member states continue to struggle and do not appear to be able to 
consolidate public finances in a way that would allow them to join the 
eurozone any time soon. 
- Hungary for instance shows little improvement with respect to the public 
deficit, which even exceeded the 9% level in 2006.   
- The Baltic States on the other hand fare better with Estonia and Latvia even 
generating a surplus in 2006. 
- Poland, the biggest of the new member states, only failed to meet the deficit 
criterion in 2006 and 2007 by a few tenths of a percent and appears to follow a 
successful path towards eventual EMU membership.  
- Our Czech and Slovakian neighbours – considered to be the next wave of 
entrants to EMU together with the Baltic States – are faring quite well after 
having introduced strict budgetary cuts and consolidation steps and reduced 
debt rates to levels of around 30% and deficit rates to just over 3%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Honohan and Lane (2003) 
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Graph 2 
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Graph 4 
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Source: OECD 
 
 
With regard to non-EMU-members, one can observe a fairly similar pattern: 
- Denmark, despite not joining EMU, followed other EU member states and 
undertook successful and concrete steps to consolidate public finances. Its 
current public debt level is as low as 30% of GDP, while at the same time it 
achieved to incur a clear budget surplus with over 3%.   
- Sweden’s case is similar to Denmark, however less pronounced with a debt 
level of around 46% and a lower budge surplus of 2.2% in 2007. 
- The UK’s case is somewhat different from the above two: on one side, the UK 
under Prime Minister Gordon Brown lowered debt rates to just over 40% of 
GDP; on the other hand it is still incurring budget deficits close to 3%.  
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5.1 EMU: so far a success story, but intra-eurozone divergences remain 
 
Considering the overall state of the eurozone and the difficult economic environment 
at the time of the euro’s birth, EMU appears to have successfully reacted to the 
common shocks experienced by its member states, among others the bursting of the 
dot.com bubble, the global shock after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the surge in global 
commodity prices and the persistence of global imbalances. 
 
In the eyes of the European Commission106, “EMU eliminated currency turmoil, 
helped growing domestic price stability…and policy coordination helped to reduce 
national policy-induced shocks.” The Commission goes on saying that “in the past 
eight years, the euro established itself as a stable and strong currency” evolving into 
“a pillar of the international monetary system, changing the face of capital markets”. 
In the Commission’s view, the current development of the euro (with a Euro/US-
Dollar exchange rate of currently over 1.45; see Graph 5) is not as worrying as 
perceived by European exporters, as the Commission welcomed it as a positive sign 
of the strength of the euro, benefiting European imports.  
 
 
Graph 5 
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The Commission107 however regrets “continued subdued and disappointing growth 
and persistent divergences in growth and inflation”, which could potentially render 
policy co-ordination in Europe more difficult and “complicate the task of the common 
monetary policy in EMU.” With regard to the latter, especially the different paths of 
Germany on one side, and Ireland and Spain on the other side are worth noting. For 
instance German growth rates – before the sub-prime- and global credit crisis at the 
end of 2007 and beginning of 2008 – seemed to have picked up (from 2% in 1999 to 
2.7% and 2.5% in 2006 and 2007 respectively). While still being higher than German 
                                                          
106 European Commission (2006), pp. 3 ff. 
107 European Commission (2007c) 
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growth rates, Ireland and Spain saw a considerable reduction in growth rates over 
the last six to seven years (with Ireland witnessing a reduction from over 10% to 
around 5%; see also Table 9 below).   
 
In its 2008-2009 economic forecasts the Austrian Institute for Economic Research 
WIFO108 attributed the slowdown in growth rates to the deterioration of international 
framework conditions, to the general slowdown of business activity, the 2007 
financial crisis, the euro appreciation that hit European export industries and high raw 
material and oil prices. In particular the latter increased during the latter half of 2007 
for several reasons109: a surge in oil demand in emerging economies like Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, rebel attacks in Nigeria, rough weather in Mexico and 
political turbulences in late 2007 in Pakistan, Algeria, Venezuela and Iran.  
As a consequence WIFO projected a fall in the Austrian growth rate from 3.4% in 
2007 to 2.2% in 2008 and 2% in 2009. In spite of that, beneficial labour market 
conditions were thought to prevail in the eurozone and unemployment rates were 
considered to remain at the record low of around 7%, with employment still 
increasing.  
 
Fears that the 2007-2008 sub-prime crisis and the corresponding US-slowdown 
would fully affect the eurozone and would lead to a Europe-wide recession were 
repeatedly played down by European policy-makers110, as economic fundamentals 
seem solid and trade losses to the USA would be compensated by trade increases 
with emerging countries like Brazil, Russia, India or China. The record inflation rate 
that is currently well over 3 % however remains a main worry. Despite the ongoing 
slowdown in growth rates and the US credit crisis, the ECB continues to resist any 
interest rate reduction in view of high inflation rates, as compared to the Fed, which 
lowered US interest in January 2007 in two steps by a total of 1.25% to a current 
level of 3%, while US Congress approved at the same time a 150 billion US-Dollar 
emergency package to counter recessionary tendencies. In particular the former step 
has led to many controversies in the USA: while markets welcomed the Fed’s step, 
fearing that the USA would move into a recession, several academics111 have 
criticised the FED for ignoring the real problems of the US economy and for 
undertaking a risky policy that could potentially have big side effects in later years.   
Overall, real GDP growth witnessed a relatively modest performance since 1998 and 
three groups of countries can be distinguished. Real GDP growth rates converged at 
the time of the euro-introduction, but started to diverge thereafter with Italy having low 
GDP growth under 2%, while Luxembourg had very high growth rates in the post-
euro-introduction years ranging around 5-6% (see Table 9 and Graph 6 below). 
Factors responsible for this trend could either be the ongoing catching-up process of 
some European economies, but also divergences in the contributions of the domestic 
and foreign sectors of growth.  
 
                                                          
108 WIFO Economic Forecast (2007) 
109 Taken, among others, from various International Herald Tribune and Financial Times issues in 
January/February 2008. 
110 Among others by Commissioner Almunia (Financial Times; January 2008), who considered EMU to be too 
independent and too strongly inter-linked by trade, or by Eurogroup President Juncker (Financial Times; 
February 2008), who did not see a danger for recession in Europe, despite a slowing down in growth rates and 
record inflation levels.  
111 Among others Walter, Schwarz; taken from various International Herald Tribune and Financial Times issues 
in January/February 2008. 
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Table 9: Real GDP growth rate (%); (at 2000 market prices) 
 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
                                          
Austria  3,5 3,5 4,6 3,6 2,4 0,3 2,7 1,9 2,6 1,8 3,6 3,3 3,4 0,8 0,9 1,1 2,4 2,0 3,1 2,9
Belgium  4,7 3,5 3,1 1,8 1,5 -1,0 3,2 2,4 1,2 3,5 1,7 3,4 3,7 0,8 1,5 1,0 3,0 1,1 3,1 2,3
Cyprus       0,7 9,7 0,7 5,9 9,9 1,8 2,3 5,0 4,8 5,0 4,0 2,0 1,8 4,2 3,9 3,8 3,8
Czech Rep.        -11,6 -0,5 0,1 2,2 5,9 4,0 -0,7 -0,8 1,3 3,6 2,5 1,9 3,6 4,2 6,1 6,1 4,9
Denmark  -0,1 0,6 1,5 1,3 2,0 -0,1 5,5 3,1 2,8 3,2 2,2 2,6 3,5 0,7 0,5 0,4 2,1 3,1 3,2 2,3
Estonia             -1,6 4,5 4,4 11,1 4,4 0,3 7,9 7,7 8,0 7,1 8,1 10,5 11,4 8,7
Finland  5,1 5,4 0,1 -6,2 -3,7 -0,9 3,6 3,9 3,7 6,1 5,2 3,9 5,0 2,6 1,6 1,8 3,7 2,9 5,5 3,1
France  4,6 3,9 2,7 1,3 1,8 -1,1 2,0 2,2 1,1 2,2 3,5 3,2 4,0 1,9 1,0 1,1 2,3 1,2 2,0 2,4
Germany          2,2 -0,8 2,7 1,9 1,0 1,8 2,0 2,0 3,2 1,2 0,0 -0,2 1,2 0,9 2,7 2,5
Greece  4,3 3,8 0,0 3,1 0,7 -1,6 2,0 2,1 2,4 3,6 3,4 3,4 4,5 5,1 3,8 4,8 4,7 3,7 4,3 3,7
Hungary          -2,1 -0,6 2,9 1,5 1,3 4,6 4,9 4,2 5,2 4,1 4,3 4,1 4,9 4,2 3,9 2,4
Ireland  4,3 6,2 7,6 1,9 3,3 2,7 5,8 9,8 8,0 12,5 9,5 11,6 10,2 5,8 6,0 4,3 4,3 5,5 6,0 5,0
Italy  4,2 3,4 2,1 1,5 0,8 -0,9 2,2 2,8 0,7 1,9 1,4 1,9 3,6 1,8 0,3 0,0 1,2 0,1 1,9 1,9
Latvia       -12,6 -32,1 -11,4 2,2 -0,9 3,8 8,3 4,7 3,3 6,9 8,0 6,5 7,2 8,7 10,6 11,9 9,6
Lithuania       -5,7 -21,3 -16,2 -9,8 3,3 5,1 8,5 7,5 -1,5 4,1 6,6 6,9 10,3 7,3 7,6 7,5 7,3
Lux.  8,5 9,8 5,3 8,6 1,8 4,2 3,8 1,4 1,5 5,9 6,5 8,4 8,4 2,5 3,8 1,3 3,6 4,0 6,2 5,0
Malta         4,7 4,5 5,7 6,2 4,0 4,9 3,4 4,1 6,4 -1,1 1,9 -2,3 0,4 3,0 2,9 3,0
Netherl. 3,0 4,8 4,1 2,4 1,5 0,7 2,9 3,0 3,4 4,3 3,9 4,7 3,9 1,9 0,1 0,3 2,0 1,5 2,9 2,8
Poland        -7,0 2,5 3,7 5,3 7,0 6,2 7,1 5,0 4,5 4,2 1,1 1,4 3,8 5,3 3,5 5,8 6,1
Portugal  7,5 6,4 4,0 4,4 1,1 -2,0 1,0 4,3 3,6 4,2 4,8 3,9 3,9 2,0 0,8 -0,7 1,3 0,5 1,3 1,8
Slovakia            7,1 6,2 5,8 6,9 5,7 3,7 0,3 0,7 3,2 4,1 4,2 5,4 6,0 8,3 8,5
Slovenia       -8,9 -5,5 2,8 5,3 4,1 3,7 4,8 3,9 5,4 4,1 2,7 3,5 2,7 4,4 4,0 5,2 4,3
Spain  5,1 4,8 3,8 2,5 0,9 -1,0 2,4 2,8 2,4 3,9 4,5 4,7 5,0 3,6 2,7 3,0 3,2 3,5 3,9 3,7
Sweden  2,6 2,7 1,0 -1,1 -1,2 -2,0 3,9 3,9 1,3 2,3 3,7 4,5 4,3 1,1 2,0 1,7 4,1 2,9 4,4 3,8
UK  5,0 2,2 0,7 -1,4 0,2 2,3 4,3 2,9 2,8 3,0 3,3 3,0 3,8 2,4 2,1 2,7 3,3 1,9 2,8 2,8
Bulgaria         -7,3 -1,5 1,8 2,9 -9,4 -5,6 4,0 2,3 5,4 4,1 5,6 5,0 6,6 6,2 6,1 6,1
Romania       -13,1 -8,7 1,5 3,9 7,1 3,9 -6,1 -4,8 -1,2 2,1 5,7 5,1 5,2 8,5 4,1 7,7 6,7
                     
E12joined 4,2 4,0 3,6 2,6 1,5 -0,8 2,5 2,4 1,5 2,6 2,8 3,0 3,9 1,9 0,9 0,8 2,0 1,4 2,6 2,1
E15joined 4,2 3,6 3,0 1,9 1,2 -0,4 2,8 2,5 1,7 2,6 2,9 3,0 3,9 1,9 1,1 1,1 2,2 1,5 2,6 2,2
                               
Japan 6,8 5,3 5,2 3,4 1,0 0,2 1,1 2,0 2,7 1,6 -2,0 -0,1 2,9 0,2 0,3 1,4 2,7 1,9 2,2 2,3
USA 4,2 3,5 1,7 -0,2 3,3 2,7 4,1 2,5 3,7 4,5 4,2 4,5 3,7 0,8 1,6 2,5 3,9 3,2 3,3 2,2
                                          
Turkey 2,1 0,3 9,3 0,9 6,0 8,0 -5,5 7,2 7,0 7,5 3,1 -4,7 7,4 -7,5 7,9 5,8 8,9 7,4 6,1 4,9
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO Database 
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Graph 6 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2007a) 
 
 
The question however remains whether divergent developments and adjustment 
difficulties with regard to public finances, inflation and growth rates are due to a lack 
of implementing the necessary policy actions in order to strengthen fiscal policies or 
due to a lack of undertaking necessary structural reforms with respect to labour, 
product and financial markets. 
Among potential reasons responsible for ongoing significant divergences, the 
Commission112 identifies:  
- Shifts in real effective exchange rates during the first years of EMU, including 
a strong decline in interest rates during the run-up to euro introduction and a 
relaxation of credit constraints on housing following an improved access to 
credits in more integrated European financial markets.  
- German re-unification, which had a sizable impact on relative competitiveness 
within the euro area. 
- A continuous lack of wage and price flexibility that have contributed to prevent 
any speedy equilibrium adjustment.  
- Differences in EMU member states in succeeding to tackle the significant 
ageing problem affecting public expenditure levels. 
- Differences in the ability to react to an increasing level of international 
competition.  
- A substantial diversity in growth components and underlying economic 
fundamentals (inter alia external demand being a relatively more important 
growth component in Germany vs. domestic demand accounting for the main 
share of economic growth in Spain). 
                                                          
112 European Commission (2007b) 
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- Investment rates that vary significantly across the eurozone. The 1990s saw a 
general drop in rates as a result of a substantial economic downturn and the 
burst of the dot.com bubble in 2000, with investment rates only starting to rise 
again in 2004-2005.  
 
 
Comparing competitiveness levels and the current account balances measured by 
real effective exchange rates (or REER) with respect to the rest of the euro-area 
(using an index based on nominal unit labour costs), the European Commission goes 
on identifying the following groups of countries that have emerged: countries in 
surplus, such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands (with a significant external 
demand component) vs. Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal (with low real interest 
rates and an increasing domestic demand level). 
 
Finally, financial markets knew a considerable degree of integration, among others 
through the introduction of the same set of rules governing European financial 
markets, equal access and equal treatment and the internationalisation of financial 
products.  
 
Trade exchanges in EMU 
 
The eurozone is a highly interlinked economic area with high intra-regional trade. As 
we have seen, intra-community exports accounted for more than 50% in Ireland and 
over 40% in Benelux.   
 
According to Milward113, the common market in Europe and the commercial power of 
the EU are the most intriguing and attractive part of European integration. In 2001, 
the EU accounted for 19.5% of total world exports and 19% of total world imports, 
compared to the USA with 15.7% and 23.7%.  
Despite the fact that significant steps were taken to widen and deepen European 
integration, e.g. several enlargements, the Single Market Programme and the EMU 
project, the EU and EMU are not yet a politically united entity and differences in 
several areas of national policies exist – for instance with respect to foreign policy 
preferences, preferences on social systems, etc. It remains undisputed however that 
the EU is a trade power of global importance and general consensus states that the 
euro will be beneficial to further increases in trade linkages between member states. 
 
One interesting question with respect to trade is however what effect EMU has had 
and will have on trade exchanges of eurozone countries with EU members that are 
not members of the eurozone. Some estimates on trade creation and trade diversion 
show only minor effects, attributing most of the trade effects to the Single Market 
Programme and other economic policy programmes, rather than to EMU exclusively. 
Other estimates114 show considerable trade creation induced by the single currency.  
 
In one of Rose’s first estimations on currency unions115 he found the trade effects of 
a currency union to be particularly large. Rose claimed that increased trade would be 
one of the few undisputed gains from forming a currency union, as it would eliminate 
exchange rate volatility, while reducing transaction costs at the same time. 
                                                          
113 Milward (2005) 
114 For instance Rose (2000) or Rose (2001a) 
115 Rose (2001b) 
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One of the main criticisms of Rose with regard to prior work on trade effects of 
currency unions was that these studies mainly concentrated on exchange rate 
volatility effects on trade. According to this approach, a common currency for Europe 
would only increase trade by a minor fraction, given that exchange rate volatility was 
already small under EMS. Together with Frankel, Rose instead used a ‘gravity’ 
model116 that led to the conclusion that the currency union effect on trade was 
potentially very large, using cross-country data sets and singling out two countries 
with the same currency. The regression model in use included income levels of the 
two respective countries, the geographic distance between them and a number of 
additional (and economically relevant) variables, one being a dummy variably, if the 
countries of interest used the same currency. Another relevant variable was 
exchange rate volatility measured as the standard deviation of the percentage 
change in bilateral nominal exchange rates. With data on over 180 countries and 
consequently over 33,000 trade flow observations for five different years (1970, 
1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990) Rose found that: 
- The higher GDP or GDP growth was for the country pair, the greater was trade 
between them, 
- The lower the distance between the country pair, the higher was trade, 
- Sharing borders, language or belonging to a regional trade agreement also 
increased trade by an economically and statistically significant amount, 
- If countries were to use or to adopt the same currency, trade exchanges would 
tend to be disproportional large – up to three times as much as with other 
comparable economies not being members of the same currency scheme. 
This effect, Rose concluded, would even surpass the advantage of eliminated 
currency volatility, which was evidently found to have a negative effect on 
trade.  
- He also stated that a common currency would also represent a credible and 
strong commitment by national authorities to long-term integration.  
 
Rose’s findings were criticised for being unrealistically high. Several re-estimations of 
the currency union trade effect, using different approaches with different samples and 
variables, however always led Rose to conclude that there was a strong currency 
union effect.   
 
In line with Rose, Micco et al.117 found similar – yet smaller – significant results. They 
estimated the currency union effect on intra-euro area trade, modelling a panel data 
set from 1992-2002 including data on bilateral trade for 22 countries – among those 
the 12 eurozone member states. They found a 4-16% trade increase effect for 
eurozone member states already in the first years of EMU’s existence. However, this 
trade effect was not found to be of the same size for all EMU member states. The 
effect was for instance even negative for Greece, but strongly positive for the 
Netherlands. One further statistically significant conclusion of Micco et al. was that 
trade growth not only took place with respect to other eurozone members, but also 
with respect to non-EMU (but EU) members and with respect to the rest of the world. 
The trade increase for those two groups was found to be similar as for other EMU 
members. 
 
                                                          
116 Frankel and Rose (1997) 
117 See Micco et al. in Baldwin et al. (2003) 
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Baldwin118 criticised the above results and attributed the findings to false modelling 
and econometrical misspecification. According to him, trade and trade creation 
effects of the euro were lower than in Rose’s and Micco’s analysis, but still positive, 
ranging from 7-9 %. He furthermore insisted that any trade effect was above all 
accentuated by the Single Market Programme.  
 
 
Table 10: The current account balance; % of GDP, various years 
 
  1985 1986 1989 1990 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria  -0.6 -0.1 -0.9 -1.2 -0.4 -1.7 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -0.3 2.5 1.7 2.1 2.9 3.7 3.2 3.1
Belgium  1.7 2.3 2.0 2.7 4.4 5.5 5.1 5.2 4.2 4.1 5.0 4.5 3.6 2.5 2.3 2.7 2.9
Cyprus . . . . . -4.7 3.1 -1.7 -5.3 -3.3 -3.7 -2.2 -5.0 -5.6 -5.9 -5.6 -5.4
Czech Republic  . . . 1.7 0.7 -6.1 -2.1 -2.5 -4.7 -5.3 -6.1 -6.5 -6.3 -2.7 -4.1 -3.0 -2.7
Denmark  -3.2 -1.5 0.9 2.1 2.9 0.6 -0.9 1.9 1.4 3.1 2.5 3.4 3.1 3.6 2.4 1.9 2.3
Estonia . . . . 1.2 -11.4 -8.7 -4.4 -5.3 -5.0 -10.4 -11.5 -12.5 -11.1 -13.9 -15.1 -14.7
Finland  -2.2 -2.8 -5.3 -4.7 -1.4 5.4 5.6 7.8 8.4 9.4 10.0 5.9 7.7 4.9 5.9 6.1 5.8
France  -1.7 -1.6 -1.5 -0.3 0.8 2.5 2.3 2.5 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.2 -0.6 -2.1 -2.0 -1.9 -1.8
Germany  4.0 4.5 0.4 . . -0.5 -0.7 -1.2 -1.6 0.0 2.2 2.0 3.9 4.2 4.7 5.6 5.7
Greece  0.7 -0.3 -2.1 -0.2 -0.8 -2.1 -3.5 -5.7 -8.8 -9.2 -9.7 -10.0 -9.5 -9.2 -11.4 -11.0 -10.5
Hungary  . . . . -8.0 -7.0 -9.1 -9.6 -8.4 -6.0 -6.9 -7.9 -8.4 -6.8 -5.9 -3.5 -2.2
Ireland  -0.2 0.6 -0.4 0.4 3.7 1.6 -0.9 -1.1 -1.7 -1.7 -1.4 0.0 -1.0 -3.1 -2.6 -3.9 -4.4
Italy  -0.3 -0.7 -2.0 -2.4 0.9 2.9 1.9 1.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.5 -1.2 -2.0 -1.7 -1.7
Latvia . . . 12.7 17.8 -5.6 -9.7 -9.0 -4.8 -7.6 -6.6 -8.2 -12.9 -12.6 -21.1 -22.4 -21.0
Lithuania . . . . -3.1 -9.8 -11.6 -10.9 -5.9 -4.7 -5.1 -6.8 -7.5 -6.9 -10.7 -12.4 -13.4
Lux. 12.3 14.8 12.3 14.5 12.7 10.4 9.2 8.4 13.2 8.8 11.6 8.0 11.8 11.1 8.6 10.5 11.9
Malta . . . . . -6.1 -6.0 -3.4 -12.5 -3.8 2.7 -2.8 -6.4 -8.3 -6.3 -5.6 -4.4
Netherlands 2.6 3.5 3.0 2.2 4.7 5.8 2.4 4.2 6.3 5.2 6.0 6.1 8.6 7.1 9.9 9.2 9.1
Poland  . . -3.8 0.3 0.2 -3.4 -3.8 -5.1 -5.8 -2.8 -2.5 -2.1 -4.4 -1.7 -2.2 -3.1 -4.3
Portugal  0.3 -2.6 -2.0 -2.3 -2.1 -6.3 -7.4 -8.9 -10.7 -10.5 -8.6 -6.5 -8.0 -9.6 -9.8 -9.5 -9.0
Slovakia  . . . . -4.1 -9.1 -9.3 -3.7 -2.3 -7.1 -7.3 -2.1 -2.5 -7.9 -7.7 -4.2 -3.7
Slovenia . . 8.5 7.3 2.2 0.3 -0.6 -3.3 -2.8 0.2 1.1 -0.8 -2.6 -2.0 -2.7 -2.4 -2.3
Spain  -0.2 -1.3 -3.7 -3.7 -1.2 0.1 -1.1 -2.7 -4.0 -4.3 -3.8 -4.0 -5.9 -7.5 -8.5 -9.1 -9.7
Sweden  0.6 0.3 -1.5 -2.6 -1.3 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.6 5.3 6.6 6.5 5.8 7.0 7.5 7.5
United Kingdom  -1.8 -4.2 -1.8 -2.1 -1.8 -0.1 -0.4 -2.4 -2.6 -2.2 -1.6 -1.3 -1.6 -2.4 -3.4 -3.9 -4.1
Bulgaria . . -4.3 -7.4 -9.4 3.5 -0.2 -4.8 -5.6 -6.1 -2.4 -5.5 -6.6 -12.0 -15.8 -16.6 -17.2
Romania . . . . . -6.3 -7.3 -1.7 -4.1 -5.7 -1.1 -4.8 -5.0 -8.7 -10.3 -12.1 -12.3
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
118 Baldwin (2006) 
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5.2 Adjustment mechanisms to improve economic conditions and future policy 
priorities 
 
In absence of independent, national monetary policies or of the ability to use interest 
rates or the exchange rate as national adjustment mechanisms to economic 
imbalances, improving the national competitiveness level becomes a key adjustment 
mechanism in EMU. A deterioration with respect to relative costs – for instance a 
falling relative productivity or adverse wage developments (for instance rising unit 
labour costs) – would consequently worsen a country’s relative position and 
competitiveness in comparison to other EMU member states. Due to the nature of 
fiscal policies in the eurozone, which are, by contrast to the federal US-system, a 
national responsibility, smoothly functioning market mechanisms are even more 
important to ensure competitive outcomes for any nation state. This is one of the 
reasons why structural reforms, especially in labour markets, have to remain a top 
priority for European policymakers.  
 
A further mechanism to note related to the national real effective exchange rate 
(REER) adjustments. If, for instance, a country suffers from recessionary tendencies 
or cyclical conditions relative to its trading partners or other EMU members, this 
country should experience lower inflationary pressures, eventually leading to a 
downward adjustment of prices relative to its partner countries. Relative changes in 
wages and prices could therefore become a shock absorber mechanism. According 
to the European Commission119, beneficial developments in REER (due to wage-, 
unit labour cost- or productivity changes) especially occurred in countries like 
Germany or Austria, but less in countries like France or Italy. 
 
One further adjustment channel to be borne in mind concerns the real interest rate 
channel120 with its effects on consumption and investment decisions, as different 
national inflation rates and different expectations with regard to the sustainability of 
government finances and growth expectations continue to exist.  
In the run-up period to the euro adoption one could witness a substantial 
convergence towards lower real interest rates, reflecting the move to lower and more 
stable inflation rates. One explanatory factor for this development was the increased 
credibility attached by markets to the “commitment by policy-makers to low inflation 
and to the loss of any exchange rate risk and the commitment to substantial fiscal 
consolidation.” 121 This was – as already pointed out above – particularly pronounced 
in Mediterranean countries like Italy, which benefited of the credibility of low EMU 
interest rates in order to qualify for the euro.  
Currently however it is possible to distinguish distinctive groups of countries in EMU: 
for instance Germany, Austria, France and Belgium have above-average real interest 
rates; Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy below-average ones.  
 
Further adjustment possibilities relate to national fiscal and structural policies, where 
the former can mitigate negative effects induced by economic shocks, and the latter 
can enhance adjustment efficiency in order to maximise the productive potential.  
 
                                                          
119 European Commission (2006), pp. 79 ff. 
120 For further discussions on real interest rates see also Mélitz (1995) 
121 European Commission (2006), pp. 114 ff. 
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Bearing in mind that Europe is very much affected by an ageing population, by 
demographic change and by increasing international competition as a side-effect of 
globalisation, it is obvious that Europe and EMU require substantial structural reform 
programmes in order to remain competitive. The Lisbon Strategy and the 2005 mid-
term review, which simplified and re-launched the Lisbon Agenda, as well as ongoing 
discussions about new integrated policy guidelines, national reform programmes and 
R&D targets, are prime examples for structural reforms sought after by European 
governments and institutions. The question however remains whether, and if, how 
much, EMU has contributed to more labour-, product- and financial market flexibility 
or whether the move towards flexibility was rather a by-product of the Single Market 
Programme. With respect to European product markets, eurozone markets still 
remain highly regulated in comparison with the UK, the USA or Japan. Progress 
however has been made since 1999 with the adoption and implementation of the 
internal market programme, larger intra-euro-area trade flows, stronger competition 
policies and the liberalisation and opening of network markets.  
 
 
5.2.1 Labour markets in EMU and labour market reforms 
 
An interesting question with respect to European labour markets relates to how EMU 
will affect labour markets and labour market institutions and whether the 
centralisation of monetary policy will have a significant influence on wage-setting, but 
also on labour market reforms122.  
 
Calmfors123 looked at how the first few years of EMU affected incentives for labour 
market reforms in Europe. He built on the assumption that European unemployment 
is largely structural and that reforms would cause the natural unemployment rate to 
fall. It is often argued that, as policy tools in EMU are limited, member states were 
forced to reform labour markets to deal with economic challenges. However, 
Calmfors argued that this does not necessarily need to be the case. Assuming that 
some form of inflation bias existed, governments and central banks would care about 
both inflation and unemployment and the central bank would be willing to accept 
higher inflation, if unemployment could be decreased. If there were inflexible labour 
markets in a country, then there would be the direct cost of higher unemployment. 
This would be the same, irrespective of whether a country was inside or outside the 
monetary union: if it was not a member of EMU, it would have the additional cost of 
higher inflation, since the corresponding central bank would increase inflation to fight 
unemployment. Under EMU however, this could not be the case, as the ECB would 
only react to general European unemployment trends and not country-specific ones. 
The cost of inflexible labour markets would consequently be greater for a country 
outside of EMU and thus incentives for reform would and should be greater. 
However, in absence of any inflation bias, if central banks were not willing to trade-off 
inflation for unemployment, labour market reforms would not have a direct effect on 
inflation rates. Incentives for reform would be, in this case, identical for both countries 
inside and outside EMU. 
 
                                                          
122 See, for instance, Kauppinen (1998) 
123 Calmfors (2001) 
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With regard to wage setting, Eichengreen124 predicted that EMU would have to 
discipline wage setting and wage demands by social partners through more credible 
and predictable monetary policy. The latter would lower overall inflation and also 
potentially lead to lower unemployment levels. Indeed, employment rates and 
employment growth are currently at relatively high levels. With respect to 
employment rates, one can observe a strong correlation between employment growth 
and real GDP growth over the period of 1992-2005, with only some national nuances.  
 
Necessary improvements with respect to wages and wage developments in EMU 
 
Another interesting question in addition to possible effects of EMU on collective 
bargaining and wage discipline concerns how EMU would affect participation and 
employment rates. Overall, EMU should bring improved framework conditions for 
employment-compatible wage bargaining behaviour. According to Pichelmann125, 
evidence indeed shows considerable wage discipline in EMU member states with 
nominal unit labour cost inflation falling at an even higher rate than price inflation. He 
concluded that social partners “appear to have taken the price stability objective set 
by the ECB” on board126. At the same time he added that the absolute dispersion of 
nominal wage growth across countries also diminished. Cross-country differences 
however still remain and fully harmonious wage developments are not (yet) 
occurring. This real wage moderation induced by social partners’ wage restraint – 
also in view of rising international competition – has eventually contributed to more 
dynamism in job creation in recent years, increasing employment rates in Europe.  
Within the next coming years with EMU and Single Market Programme effects fully 
setting in, labour markets are bound to become more flexible within EMU. By then 
they will be characterised by decreased rents, a change in the form of wage 
bargaining and negotiation processes, further labour market reforms with respect to 
employment benefits and protection and with respect to the nature of labour 
contracts.   
 
Policy priorities…with respect to labour markets 
 
Smooth functioning of EMU and future characterisation of EMU as a OCA will depend 
on whether prevailing wage and price rigidities will be reduced, making factor prices a 
potential absorption tool in case of idiosyncratic shocks. Adjustment in European 
labour markets translates mostly in labour layoffs, while wages tend to be sticky 
downwards due to trade union resistance – at least in the short run. Structural 
reforms in European labour markets (among others with regard to wage setting 
mechanisms, pension reforms, welfare and unemployment benefits, employment 
protection legislation, labour taxation and migration policies; see Graph 7 and 8 
below), combined with further product market integration that will have spill-over 
effects into labour markets, will therefore be essential to yield the necessary 
‘flexibilisation’ of labour. 
 
 
 
                                                          
124 Eichengreen (1998) 
125 Pichelmann in Buti and Sapir (2003), ch. 11, pp. 281 ff. 
126 Pichelmann in Buti and Sapir (2003), ch. 11, pp. 281 ff. 
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Graph 7: Reforms in the euro area127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127 Taken from European Commission (2007b) 
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Graph 8: Structural reforms in euro-area labour markets128 
 
 
 
 
Product market integration and competition, according to Buti129, has a 
“homogenisation effect on heterogeneous labour market environments” – in other 
words product market integration is ultimately leading to structural changes in labour 
market institutions. If institutional adjustments cannot be guaranteed, structural 
unemployment will remain a significant problem in Europe leading to substantial 
productivity and employability effects. Adequate, but not too strict product and labour 
market regulations are therefore essential to cushion shocks.  
 
Necessary improvement of labour markets – mobility and migration rates 
 
Several studies on labour markets130 keep insisting on the continuous weakness of 
intra-European labour mobility. Mobility in Europe has always been low for historical, 
cultural, social and political reasons and the fact that there are language barriers may 
explain why Europe knows, in comparison to the USA, an intrinsically low mobility 
level of workers. A consensus however exists that this low mobility is comparable to 
mobility levels at the regional and country-level.  
                                                          
128 Taken from European Commission (2007b) 
129 Buti (2003) 
130 Among others Eichengreen (1998), Tassinopoulos and  Werner (1998), Papademos (2003) 
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For instance when looking at net migration rates in Germany131, one can see that 
intra-eurozone migration from and to Germany constitutes only a very small portion of 
total immigration. Internal migration is about four to five times larger than immigration 
from EMU, but compared to the USA, internal migration is still significantly lower 
(according to Krueger132: 3% for the US compared to 1% for most European 
countries). Migration and mobility rates will probably pick up a bit in the coming years, 
especially once the temporary restrictions regarding the freedom of movement of the 
new EU member states will have expired. Nevertheless US-like mobility rates are 
unlikely to be reached.  
 
Graph 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to improve the functioning of EMU in the long-run, one aim with respect to 
labour markets will be to improve intra-European labour mobility through mobility 
schemes and programmes. Such mobility measures for instance relate to education 
and life-long-learning programmes. In this context, the inter-university student 
exchange programme ERASMUS that recently had seen its 1 millionth exchange 
student should be noted. In addition to these programmes, improving working 
conditions and facilitation of Europe-wide social security and pension coverage are 
important to note. 
 
 
5.2.2 Regional differences 
 
The EU has a system of structural funds that aims at reducing structural differences 
between regions and at increasing overall cohesion. This is particularly relevant with 
regional unemployment differentials being higher in Europe than in the USA, while 
disequilibrium adjustment is slower133. Eichengreen for instance showed that output 
growth is more correlated in the US with a higher impulse response after an 
economic shock has hit the economy. At the same time, wage elasticity with respect 
to wage differentials and regional unemployment are higher in the USA while 
                                                          
131 Data taken from the “German Statistical Yearbook” and from “Recent Demographic Developments in 
Europe” by Eurostat. 
132 Krueger (2000) 
133 See for instance Eichengreen (1990) and (1998), Krugman (1991), de Grauwe (2002) 
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adjustment-responses in Europe only tend to be similar to the US when it comes to 
the long-run.  
 
In order to reduce the probability of asymmetric shocks hitting the economy, the 
smoothing out of regional differences within Europe in order to achieve cohesion is 
therefore not only desirable, but also necessary. The current volume of structural 
funds, the lack of a federal EU-budget allowing for intra-European transfers and the 
accession of new member states in bigger need of receiving structural funds will 
make it even more important to introduce adequate policy responses.  
 
 
5.2.3 The ECB and monetary policy 
 
The main goal of the ECB, as established in its statutes, is the maintenance of price 
stability, which is considered to be the ECB’s best contribution to sound economic 
growth. Credibility levels play to this respect an important role, because “a lack of 
anti-inflation credibility for the ECB” would lead to a short-run “deflationary pressure 
in EMU”134. Harsh anti-inflationary monetary policy, as executed especially in its early 
years, was required to ensure inflation convergence within EMU and necessary for 
the ECB to build up a high reputation level as.135A strong central bank therefore is 
essential to solve the time consistency problem that could adversely affect a 
successful monetary policy in EMU and at the same time this helped preventing 
costly inflation to society. Overall, this also contributed to reducing uncertainty in 
financial markets.   
 
Nevertheless, there are weaknesses and criticism with respect to the ECB: critics 
state that having price stability as the sole policy target with rigid quantitative rules 
has been unfavourable to investment and economic growth, due to high interest 
rates. Furthermore, there is regular criticism on the near fully independent statute of 
the ECB and the resulting lack of accountability136. While the Fed and the Bank of 
England depend on federal government backing and policy guidelines, the ECB is 
not only independent with regard to decision-making, but the absence of significant 
control and consultation possibilities make the whole monetary policy formulation 
process seem fairly intransparent. Especially in the presence of the SGP, more 
transparency in monetary policy would be desirable.  
 
 
5.2.4 Fiscal policy 
 
On the fiscal side, EMU started out with the clear pledge for fiscal sustainability under 
voluntarily imposed fiscal rules that would induce countries to reduce both debt and 
deficit levels. Both fiscal credibility and structural necessities played a large part in 
this. On one side, high debt levels were considered to adversely affect the real side 
of the economy, raising capital costs and reducing investment, affecting business 
confidence and laying ground for an eventual debt crisis. On the other side, budget 
deficit control was an important contributor to achieving fiscal discipline and credibility 
                                                          
134 See Krueger’s chapter in Blejer (1997) 
135 See Buti and Sapir (2003) 
136 See for instance recent criticism in the media on the ECB objective and its set-up made by French President 
Sarkozy. 
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in the run-up to, and the actual functioning of EMU. High deficits were tabooed by 
decision-makers as an unjust and unfair way to achieve competitive advantages over 
other countries and therefore rules-based deficit reduction was considered necessary 
to avoid political business cycles and national spill-overs. Deficits as such were not 
forbidden, but the aim of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the SGP was to 
avoid excessive deficits and potential debt crises.  
 
The breaching of the 3% by Germany and France around 2004-05 led to heated 
discussions on the sense and the strength of the pact, especially in the summer of 
2004 when the ECOFIN Council did not agree on punitive action on these countries. 
In July 2004, the European Court of Justice decided that the Council should not 
depart from the treaty’s provisions, yet conceded that it had “some discretion from 
European Commission’s recommendations”137. This obviously contributed to shed 
even more bad light on an already very controversial pact and risked to create 
structural imbalances and affect adversely the “credibility and stability of the euro”138. 
Calls by former European Commission President Prodi139 (who called the pact 
“stupid, rigid and imperfect” in October 2002) for more intelligent mechanisms and 
flexibility finally led to a softening of the pact in the spring of 2005 when the 
Commission agreed on more flexibility by referring to “new criteria”, i.e. more 
tolerance on deficit levels, if the country 
- had relatively low debt levels, 
- was a net-payer to the EU, 
- was pledging to undertake reforms in labour markets or pension systems, 
- was undertaking investment efforts in R&D in view of the Lisbon agenda.  
 
The last to years however saw considerable improvements of public deficit levels 
within EMU, with only France, Greece, Italy and Portugal struggling to adhere to the 
3% limit. Germany and Austria however – despite not being able to meet a nil-deficit 
currently have deficit levels well below 2% (see Table 7 above). Despite the ongoing 
controversy accompanying any discussion on the SGP and its usefulness, critics of 
any softening of the SGP – especially European institutions, the ECB and national 
central banks – referred to the loss of credibility and reproached governments to 
potentially weaken the euro, while at the same time showing unwillingness for 
undertaking necessary and urgent structural reforms. This is in line with Buti and 
Sapir140 who claimed that the SGP did leave “sufficient manoeuvre space” and that it 
was necessary to avoid spill-over effects of policy-induced asymmetric shocks. With 
fiscal policy remaining a national prerogative, there is definite need for European 
countries to commit to multilateral surveillance mechanisms and to address structural 
rigidities. Without a central budget system in place allowing for fiscal transfers, EMU 
needs “at least effective co-ordination”141 as budgetary spill-over through import 
channels and interest rate differences could negatively affect EMU. Avoiding too 
large tax and interest rate differences, as well as business cycle synchronisation and 
policy convergence, are necessary in order to reduce the probability of concentrated 
asymmetric shocks hitting EMU countries and the SGP could be the necessary 
commitment tool to achieve convergence within EMU.  
                                                          
137 Der Standard, July 2004 
138 See Buti and Sapir (1998) 
139 Der Standard, October 2002 
140 Buti and Sapir (1998) 
141 Eijffinger and de Haan (2000) 
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5.2.5 Financial integration 
 
Another final important aspect of European integration process was capital market 
liberalisation and the integration of national financial markets with harmonised 
practices, recognised national rules to increase competition and minimum insurance 
rules. Full financial integration was considered to be a necessary requirement for the 
completion of an internal and integrated market, as financial capital flows in a fully 
integrated market would foster adaptability and constitute an important adjustment 
mechanism in EMU.  
 
With respect to bonds and equity markets, a harmonisation of regulation and the 
elimination of differences in the legal, regulatory and tax framework, all constitute an 
important factor for the smooth functioning of EMU and facilitate the adjustment 
process in case of asymmetries. According to de Grauwe142, the occurrence of a 
shock that pushes down stock market prices in the presence of one integrated 
market would affect holders in the whole union and not only in one country – i.e. risk 
would be shared across the union. Stable rules are considered to be important to 
control the potential risk of contagion – therefore, policymakers have to commit 
themselves to implement and strengthen already existing cross-border and cross-
sector supervision. This becomes even more urgent after the recent sub-prime and 
credit market crisis that spread from the USA to Europe and led to significant stock 
market contraction in European countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
142 De Grauwe (2002) 
 69
6. Concluding remarks and an outlook into the future 
 
This thesis has tried to show that EMU constitutes a unique experiment with no 
precedence in monetary history. The setting-up of EMU marked the ultimate step of 
economic integration by replacing national currencies with a single European 
currency while helping to create an economically strong Europe. In Jonung’s view143 
EMU practically affects “every area of economic policy making in Europe: it will 
influence the allocation of resources, the distribution of income, stability and growth, 
as well as the formal and informal institutions on labour, product and financial 
markets within the euro area.”  
 
So far, empirical data has shown positive signs and trends, especially in the run-up 
period to euro adoption, where countries have undertaken significant steps to 
consolidate public finances and to lower inflation rates. Initially, the outlook in the 
early 1990s prior to EMU was not bright with fairly big differences with respect to 
successful convergence towards the Maastricht criteria. These differences would 
have threatened the successful and sustainable implementation of EMU. A reversal 
of this trend however was noticeable in the period between 1993 and 1998 with a 
general improvement towards meeting the criteria. 
 
Ever since the euro’s introduction, the eurozone witnessed at first a general reduction 
in inflation rates – yet with national differences. Over the last two years however, a 
considerable rise in eurozone inflation rates to levels well above the ECB objective of 
2% could be noted. At the same time, consolidation of public finances was 
undertaken at different speed levels and some countries were more successful than 
others. While Benelux-countries or Finland have coped well, big countries especially 
have had significant problems in meeting the required deficit and debt criteria.   
 
Looking at the first few years of EMU however, it appears that EMU has successfully 
reacted to the common shocks experienced by its member states, among others the 
bursting of the dot.com bubble, the global shock after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
surge in global commodity prices and the persistence of global imbalances. 
 
 
Considering the complexity of the issue and the variety of factors responsible for its 
creation, economic theory as such would doubt that EMU in today’s form would 
conform to such an optimum currency area. But exactly the complexity of EMU and 
the variety of factors playing in were responsible that theoretical consideration, which 
– although being taken into account and still somewhat serving as a basis of 
discussion – were after all not decisive and could not prevent the creation of a 
monetary union on Europe. EMU’s unique nature shows that not only economic 
factors have played a role in forming EMU, because economists in particular have 
been very critical with respect to foregoing autonomous monetary policy and to 
replace national currencies by a single European currency.  
 
In order to ensure that EMU will continue to work smoothly and function even better 
than so far, it is therefore essential that certain conditions are fulfilled and problems 
are being tackled in the years to come.  
                                                          
143 Jonung, Lars, in Buti and Sapir (2003), ch. 16, p. 409  
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One of the main questions, considering the ongoing divergence of European 
economies in some areas and the fact that policy challenges still need to be 
addressed, relates to whether EMU member states will be able to undertake urgent 
structural policy reforms. 
 
Some of these structural reform necessities concern: 
 
- Ensuring a prudent budgetary policy, which is in line with the SGP, and which 
is essential in order to allow for budgetary consolidation in ‘good times’. 
- Reform public finances to ensure long-run fiscal sustainability while securing 
the welfare state.  
- Take the necessary steps to achieve more flexibility in product markets. 
- Accelerate financial market integration. 
- Undertake reforms with respect to labour markets that aim at higher 
participation, more flexibilisation and less rigidities, better education and more 
moderate wage setting internalising implications of the monetary union. 
- Reinforce economic policy coordination with fellow EMU member states. 
 
One other question in the European context will be how fiscal policy will be used in 
the future to compensate for the loss of monetary policy independence. Should the 
emphasis be laid onto the creation of a larger federal budget that allows for transfer 
payments towards regions suffering from an economic decline or should fiscal policy 
remain a national prerogative that has to be well co-ordinated between countries, as 
Buti recommended144. The question therefore concerns the effectiveness of adhering 
to the SGP and the credibility of nation states to abide by the rules of the SGP. In 
Zamagni’s145 view the problem with EMU is not the existence of the SGP, but rather 
the non-convergence of economies and economic policies.  
 
 
Considering the way EMU has evolved and worked during its first few years of 
existence and given the somewhat mixed developments we have seen so far, one 
can conclude that European decision-makers need to identify and address these 
European problems and come up with adequate policy responses that do not 
threaten the framework of EMU. The success of EMU will in this context depend on 
the collective political willingness in the decision-making process. Credibility, 
according to Buti and Sapir146, is in this respect one of the most important aspects of 
EMU: credible policies, credible decision-makers and credible decision-making 
processes are all necessary in order to ensure that EMU continues to function well. 
EMU requires unconditional and credible commitment, bearing in mind that it 
constitutes an irreversible decision. Without co-ordination of policies and discipline in 
the execution thereof, EMU’s strength will clearly be undermined. European policy-
makers are therefore well advised to follow a well-defined policy-mix, avoid fiscal 
laxity and commit themselves to solve relevant structural problems that are 
potentially harmful to EMU. The next coming years, in this respect, will be decisive in 
order to show whether European policy-makers will be serious and will be taking the 
necessary steps. 
 
                                                          
144 For a thorough analysis of the debate see Buti (2003) 
145 Zamagni (2000) 
146 Buti and Sapir (1998) 
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Abstract 
 
 
The start of EMU marked a new era in economic and monetary history in Europe, 
dramatically changed the environment of monetary and economic policy in general, 
always giving rise to vivid debates in economic theory and European policy making. 
Overall, economic reasoning behind creating EMU was to lay foundations ensuring 
increased prosperity and welfare, to increase market efficiency and competition in 
Europe, while keeping monetary stability.  
 
Despite economics being a prime motive for the formation of EMU, other factors, 
such as politics, the historical context, but also theoretical considerations, were 
responsible for the replacement of national currencies with the euro.  
 
This thesis tries to take into account the variety of factors coming into play and 
attempts to offer an insight on this significant step in European monetary integration, 
while also assessing the first few years of EMU’s existence, which give a somewhat 
differentiated image of its success: prior to the euro’s introduction, efforts have 
successfully been undertaken to consolidate pubic finances and lower inflation rates, 
yet ever since the adoption of the euro in 1999 (or the physical introduction in 2002), 
member states have started to somewhat drift apart again.  
 
The question remains whether these divergent developments and adjustment 
difficulties with regard to public finances, inflation and growth rates are due to a lack 
of implementing the necessary policy actions in order to strengthen fiscal policies or 
due to a lack of undertaking necessary structural reforms with respect to labour, 
product and financial markets.  
 
The overall conclusion of this thesis is that addressing these divergent developments 
will be essential in order to ensure the smooth functioning and the success of EMU. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Der Beginn der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) markierte eine neue Ära in 
der europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsgeschichte, veränderte drastisch 
Wirtschafts- und Währungspolitik in Europa und wurde – sowohl vor und nach deren 
Entstehung – Gegenstand zahlreicher hitziger Debatten.  
 
Wirtschaftliche Ziele der WWU waren es, eine adäquate Basis zu legen, welche 
Wohlfahrt und Prosperität garantiere, Effizienz und Wettbewerb der Märkte erhöhe 
und gleichzeitig Stabilität der Währungsmärkte sicherstelle. Wiewohl wirtschaftliche 
Aspekte ausschlaggebend gewesen sein mögen, spielten andere Faktoren – unter 
anderem politische, der historische Kontext und theoretische Überlegungen – eine 
Rolle bei der Ablöse nationaler Währungen durch den Euro.  
 
Diese Arbeit versucht diese verschiedenen Faktoren zu berücksichtigen, diesen 
wichtigen Schritt der europäischen Währungsintegration näher zu erläutern und 
gleichzeitig auch die ersten Jahre der WWU zu beurteilen, welche ein gemischtes 
Bild bieten: vor der Einführung des Euros wurden erfolgreich Schritte unternommen, 
öffentliche Finanzen zu konsolidieren und Inflationsraten zu senken, aber seit der 
Einführung des Euros in 1999 (beziehungsweise der physischen Einführung in 2002) 
hat sich gezeigt, dass sich die WWU-Mitgliedsstaaten wirtschaftlich wieder langsam 
von einander entfernen beginnen.  
 
Die essentielle Frage ist daher, ob dieser Trend und die Anpassungsschwierigkeiten 
mancher Länder in Bezug auf öffentliche Finanzen sowie Inflations- und 
Wachstumsraten ihren Ausgangspunkt darin haben, dass notwendige politische 
Schritte zur Stärkung von Fiskalpolitiken nur ungenügend angegangen wurden oder 
ob das Fehlen notwendiger Strukturreformen in Bezug auf Arbeits-, Güter- und 
Finanzmärkte dafür verantwortlich sind und waren.  
 
Abschließend betont diese Arbeit die Wichtigkeit, dass genaue die aufgezeigten, 
divergierenden Trends und Anpassungsschwierigkeiten beseitigt gehören, um in 
Zukunft das Funktionieren und den Erfolg der WWU sicherzustellen.  
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